Editorial

The selected papers published in this volume were presented at an Estonian-Latvian workshop in Daugavpils, Latvia, in August 2005 titled "The Russian-speaking minority in Estonia and Latvia in the mirror of oral history." The workshop was the result of co-operation between the University of Daugavpils, the Estonian National Museum and the Centre for the Study of Soviet History, University of Tartu, aimed at bringing together scholars from both countries in an interdisciplinary and inspiring atmosphere. Two Estonian research grants have been involved ("Subcultures of Estonian Russians, Old Believers and other non-Estonians," ETF 5589, and "Estonian-Russian relations," TFLAJ 2544).

During and after the restoration of Baltic independence, the question of the Russian-speaking minority has been the theme of heated political debates, extensive discussions and polemic. A vast amount of research in the Baltic States, the West and Russia has been conducted dealing with minority questions, citizenship and integration in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. From time to time, the minority question even influenced the political relations of the Russian Federation and the Baltic States and seemed to be a key issue. Now, after more than a decade of independence, successful state-building and transition — emotions having settled down and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania having joined NATO and the European Union in 2004 — it is the proper time to explore some other aspects related to the Russian-speaking minority. Like the workshop,this volume will be interdisciplinary and dealing with ethnological, historical and sociological topics.

The opening paper by Jaanus Plaat provides an overview of the identity and demographic situation of Russian Old Believers in Estonia since the 18th century. Old Believers migrated to Estonia beginning from the late 17th century and lived mainly on the western shores of the Lake Peipsi (Peipus). Their community is still extant and they usually did not interbreed with Lutherans and Orthodox Believers. The greatest challenge in recent history was the period of Soviet rule and forced secularization in the 20th century.

Irēna Saleniece analyzes the way the history of 20th century Latvia is viewed by Russians from Eastern Latvia. Very often the personal historical experience and the attitude towards history are inter-related. History is as

a sort of background for private life events of the narrator. Fragments and individual remarks offer the opportunity to assemble a vision of history like a mosaic. An important conclusion is that perception, understanding and evaluation of different historical periods depend mostly on the individual fate, political views and social status of the narrator, and not on his or her ethnic origin. Saleniece's paper is based on oral history sources.

An article by Olaf Mertelsmann asks how the Russians came to have an image of the "national enemy" of Estonians. Traditionally, the Baltic Germans fulfilled this role and the Estonian attitude towards Russians was more or less neutral. The shift from one to another image of an "enemy" occurred thanks to the occupation and annexation of Estonia by the Soviet Union and the years of Stalinism that followed. The personal experience of Estonians with Stalinist terror and crimes and the identification of Russian with Soviet triggered the development as did immigration and the fear of Russification. The paper is based on archival research and the use of life stories.

Triin Vihalemm explores strategies of identity re-construction in post-Soviet Estonia. Her article is based on the concept of cultural trauma by Piotr Sztompka and analyzes how people place narratives and concepts related to the collapse of the USSR in their mind and how they cope with the rise of national ideology. Identities of ethnic Estonians and Estonia's Russians differ and have changed during the period of transition. Survey data is extensively presented and interpreted.

The last paper, by Riina Reinvelt, makes use of diary notes by Estonian students, who participated in fieldwork in Narva, to analyze the perception of Russians among the students. The fieldwork was conducted in 2003 and the nearly entirely Russian-speaking town of Narva was initially an alien environment for the young Estonians.

A review by Anu Kannike on *Arbeit im Sozialismus — Arbeit im Postsozialismus* edited by Klaus Roth closes this volume. This collection of 26 articles presents an overview of recent research on the concept of work and the everyday reality in the workplace in the Socialist and Post-Socialist space. For the self-assurance of the Socialist regimes, workers played an essential role, but they did interpret their fate often in a quite different way than did the regimes.

Olaf Mertelsmann

The Identity and Demographic Situation of Russian Old Believers in Estonia. (With Regard to the Period of the 18th to the Early 21st Century)[1]

Jaanus Plaat

Introduction

Russian Old Believers, who came to Estonia starting from the late 17th century settled mainly on the western coast of Lake Peipsi (Peipus, in Russian: *Prichudie*). Today Lake Peipsi Old Believers reside mostly in four centres: 1) the town of Mustvee and Raja village bordering on it; 2) the town of Kallaste; 3) Kolkja-Kasepää-Varnja street villages; 4) and villages on Piirissaare Island. In the course of centuries Estonians, Russian Orthodox and Russian non-believers have also come to live in these centres. Until now, many Old Believers differentiate between "our own" and "alien" or "we" and "them" not so much by nationality but by faith. So not only (Lutheran) Estonians, with whom Old Believers have generally got along well, but also Orthodox Russians and Russian non-believers, who settled here mainly during the Soviet period (so-called *Sovetskiye*[2]) are regarded as aliens. Religion has served as a basis for Lake Peipsi Old Believers' identity for centuries, for a long time overshadowing the ethnic and linguistic identities. The culture of Lake Peipsi Old Believers, most singularly in Estonian conditions, has been preserved as very original until today. This article is devoted to the issues of identity of Old Believers

[1] This article was written as part of a project funded by the Estonian Science Foundation (grant No. 5589).

[2] For instance, Tatyana Maximova wrote about her interviews in Mustvee in 1999: "The Russians, who came in the Soviet times, are perceived by the local population as distinct from the local Russians who have been living here for a while. There is clear distinction between the local Russians and Soviet Russians. One respondent, a Russian, said that "Sovetskiye" are very different from "Russkiye"" (2001: 38).

in Estonia, above all, the religious identity, and the changes that have occurred during the 20th century.

On the basis of mainly religious identity, the article also aims to give a survey of the demographic situation of Estonian Old Believers during the past few centuries. The period covered here extends mainly from the 18th century until today, regarding which different authors, due to lack of more detailed data, have presented very different estimates concerning the number of Old Believers on the coast of Lake Peipsi and all over Estonia (besides Lake Peipsi area Old Believers also reside in Tartu, Tallinn and elsewhere). It is especially complicated to estimate the number of Old Believers during the Soviet period, when identifying one with a religion could have resulted in persecution by the atheist authorities. The same kind of uncertainty about the number of people classified as Old Believers by their religious identity also reigned in the 1990s, when the estimates given by different authors varied from 2,000 to 10,000. In an article published in 1999, Juha Pentikäinen and Taisto Raudalainen, researchers of Old Believers, wrote about Estonia: "There is no current information available on either the numerical strength of the contemporary Old Believers in the area, or their affiliation with various branches of the Old Faith." This article is an attempt to fill in this gap. The author has made use of the materials of the Archive of the Estonian Commissioner of the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults of the Soviet Union (ACARC)[3]; the data provided by the Department of Religious Affairs at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which keeps count of the denominations registered in Estonia since the 1990s; and the census conducted in Estonia in 2000. From the articles, monographs and source publications treating Old Believers in Estonia, the author has mostly used surveys of the history of

[3] Part of this archive is in the Estonian State Archives and its branch (ERA, Eesti Riigiarhiiv; ERAF, Eesti Riigiarhiivi Filiaal) and part of the documents is preserved in the archive of the Department of Religious Affairs at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Estonia. In this article, the author has used the following collections of the latter: "Otshety i spravki o sostoianii i deiatelnosti tserkvei v Estonskoi SSR" (OS, *Отчеты и справки о состоянии и деятельности церквей в Эстонской ССР*); "Perepiska s raznymi sovetskimi organami i obshestvennymi organizatsiami po voprosam religii" (PSO, *Переписка с разными советскими органами и общественными организациями по вопросам религий*). Abbreviations for these archive documents are: f. = *fond* (collection), n. = *nimistu* (register), s. = *säilik* (storage item), d. = *delo* (file), l. = *leht, list* (leaf, page).

Old Believers by Galina Ponomarjova (1999)[4], Juha Pentikäinen and Taisto Raudalainen (1999), and Eiki Berg and Hill Kulu (1996).

In addition to that, this article aims to consider the main changes that occurred in the relations between Old Believers and authorities in the 20th century, which had a direct influence on the demographic situation of Old Believers and the development of their congregations under different rules. A brief survey is also given of Lake Peipsi Old Believers' attitude towards Russians and Estonians of a different faith and vice versa.

Russian Old Believers in Estonia until 1918

The western coast of Lake Peipsi (*Chudskoye*) was settled in the late 16th century. In the 16th–17th centuries, the population was mostly Estonian, but there were also Russian fishermen, who constituted about 20% of the north western coastline population. The first Russian Old Believers appeared on the coast of Lake Peipsi near Mustvee in the late 17th century, when trying to escape from the persecution of authorities and the Russian Orthodox Church. The 18th century was marked by the growing resettlement of Old Believers from different provinces of Russia and Poland. In Estonia, two branches of Priestless Old Believers found shelter. Later on the so-called *Fedoseievtsy* (*Rabskie*) formed two congregations (Raja, Väike-Kolkja), but the majority of Old Believers are *Pomortsy*. The enemies of Old Believers called them *Raskolniki*, whereas Old Believers called themselves *Starovery* (Moora 1964: 52 ff.; Berg, Kulu 1996: 1166–1169; Pentikäinen, Raudalainen 1999: 87–89; Ponomarjova 1999: 32).

The number of Old Believers increased in the fishing villages of Lake Peipsi especially in the 19th century. According to the archival sources, studied by Yelizaveta Richter, the population of Russian settlements on the coast of Lake Peipsi increased as follows: in 1782 – 811, in 1811 – 1,172, in 1820–2,700 and in 1846 – 4,600 persons. Old Believers constituted the majority of them (Richter 1976: 21; see also: Moora 1964: 94–97; Kurs 1996: 28; *Ocherk*i... 2004: 105).

From the year 1855 onwards, we have an exact number of Old Believers. According to a thorough list allegedly comprising all the Old Believers residing on the western coast of Lake Peipsi (including children), in 1855 the population of Old Believers comprised 3,278 persons (see:

[4] Ponomarjova's article "Russian Old Believers in Estonia" was published on the home page of Estonian Old Believers, too (see: www.starover.ee/history.html).

Ocherki... 2004: 25 ff.). In 1857, in the whole of the Livonian guberniya, the authorities estimated the number of Old Believers to be 12,680 (3,880 of them in Tartu County and 8,005 in the town of Riga) and in 1867 – 12,990 (3,159 in Tartu County and 8,798 in Riga) (*Ocherki...* 2004: 122). In the light of these figures, it is obviously an overestimate that in the middle of the 19th century the number of Old Believers on the coast of Lake Peipsi could have amounted to 5,000–6,000 (Pentikäinen, Raudalainen 1999: 86). Yet, besides the Livonian guberniya, Old Believers also lived in Tallinn and elsewhere in the Estonian guberniya.

According to the census of 1897, there might have been approximately 6,700 Old Believers (*Raskolniki*) on the then Estonian territory, constituting 0.7% of the total population of Estonia.[5]

The number of Old Believers increased despite persecution by authorities, which also took place in Estonia. Repression of Estonian Old Believers was especially severe during the reign of Tsar Nicholas I (1825–1855). If the middle of the 18th century, and the latter half of it, was the time for erecting worshipping places for Old Believers in the villages on the coast of Lake Peipsi,[6] then the first half of the 19th century was the time of closing them down. During the years 1840–1860, the only building for worship, operating in Estonia, was the one in Kasepää village (Pentikäinen, Raudalainen 1999: 90–91). Galina Ponomarjova described the persecution of Old Believers as follows:

"In the 19th century, the authorities tried to strengthen the position of the Orthodoxy in Prichudie in every possible way. A new Orthodox Church was built in Nos (Nina) village inhabited by members of the Orthodoxy. In the 1830s, its priest A. Orlov repeatedly wrote reports against Old Believers. Criminal proceedings were often instituted on the grounds of these reports. The following accusations were brought against

[5] Protestants (mostly Lutherans) made up 84.2%, Orthodox – 14.3%, Jews – 0.5% and Roman Catholics – 0.4% of the total population. The Russians who lived on the Estonian territory (4% of the total population in 1897) were mostly Orthodox, yet, the majority of the Orthodoxy was constituted already by Estonians. This was due to the Estonians' movement to change the faith (from Lutheran to Orthodox Church), which took place in South Estonia in the 1840s and in North Estonia in the 1880s. In 1897, the percentage of Orthodox among Estonians was 12 (Palli 1998: 29–31).

[6] Thus the worshipping centre in Kükita (Kikita) village was built in 1740. In the middle and the second half of the 18th century, new chapels appeared in Varnja (Varone), Kallaste (Krasnye Gory), Kasepää (Kasepel), Kolkja (Kolki) and Mustvee (Cherna, Chernyi Posad) (Ponomarjova 1999: 33–34). According to Ott Kurs, the first Old Believers' chapel in Mustvee was built in 1795 (1996: 30). According to archival records the worshipping chapels in Mustvee, Kallaste and Piirissaare were completed not later than in 1802 (www.starover.ee/kirikud).

Old Believers: their children were baptised in their faith, parents were not married in the Orthodox Church, Old Believers blamed the latter and its ministers. It was prohibited not only to baptise and marry, but also to bury by Old Believer customs. In Tartu, therefore, a chief of police ordered the burial of an Old Believer preceptor (*nastavnik*) at night. In Prichudie villages, Orthodox priests took children away from their parents to be baptised into the Orthodox faith and to be brought up in Russian Orthodox families. Of course, there were also rich and influential people among Old Believers. For example, Old Believer merchants from Dorpat repeatedly bribed the police. But forces were unequal." (Ponomarjova 1999: 35.)

Also, the older form of liturgy was forbidden, old books, icons and Old Believers' prayer houses were burnt down by soldiers in the 1830s (Pentikäinen, Raudalainen 1999: 90; see also *Ocherki…* 2004: 105–143).

The Tsar's manifesto of 1905, in principle, brought about religious tolerance in the Russian Empire. The status of Old Believers and the name *Old Believers* were established. So far the authorities and the enemies of Old Believers called them *Raskolniki.* But the real opportunities for free development were given to Old Believers in Lake Peipsi villages during the period of the independent Republic of Estonia (1918–1940).

Old Believers in the Republic of Estonia (1918–1940)

On the western coast of Lake Peipsi, the religious life of Old Believers remained active throughout the 1920s–1930s. The Republic of Estonia brought about a considerably greater freedom of religion than had existed during the reign of Orthodox Tsars. Yet, Old Believers were also persecuted. They were therefore displeased with the prohibition in 1932 against celebrating church feasts, according to the old calendar. Old Believers refused to hold church services according to the new calendar observed by the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church. A group of the mentors (*nastavnik, batyushka*) predicted that Old Believers' worship centers would be burnt down and once again expectations of the imminent end of the world started to spread among Old Believers (Sild, Salo 1995: 143, 187; Pentikäinen, Raudalainen 1999: 91). Relations with the authorities became so strained that, in 1935, Old Believers' worshipping places were closed down and some of the mentors were deported (Berg, Kulu 1996: 1179). After the Old Believers had sent a petition to President Konstantin Päts, the situation received a peaceful solution favorable to the Old Believers.[7]

The number of Old Believers in Estonia remained stable throughout the

1920s-1930s. The census of 1922 counted 5,114 and the one of 1934 – 5,276 Old Believers (Risch 1937: 122, 133), who in both cases constituted 0.5% of the Estonian population, making up the fourth grouping by size after Lutherans, Orthodox and Baptists.[8]

Yet, so far, as a rule, the treatments have presented much bigger figures for Old Believers. According to Kurs and Berg, in the 1930s, the number of Old Believers in the 14 *Prichudie* villages amounted to 7,000–8,000 (1998: 63–64). In addition to that, Old Believers also resided in Tallinn and Tartu, where, besides the ten *Prichudie* congregations their own Old Believers' congregations operated. The total number of Old Believers, in Estonia before World War II, was supposed to have been, according to one estimate, approximately 8000 (Berg, Kulu 1996: 1169), according to others – about 9,000–10,000 (Pentikäinen, Raudalainen 1999: 84; Ponomarjova 1999: 41).[9]

Perhaps it is possible that 8,000–10,000 persons belonged to the aforementioned 12 Old Believers' congregations by birth. Yet, it seems that the number of people, who really considered themselves as Old Believers by faith, was less, by almost half, than the number of those who lived in the Old Believers' villages and were regarded as Old Believers (from the cultural point of view) by researchers. Here, we have to consider the fact that, both at the census of 1922 and 1934, the children's faith was noted down according to their parents' words. Therefore, the small number of Old Believers, in censuses, is not related to the fact that children were omitted. It is also possible that some researchers have included many of the Orthodox in the Peipsi region among the number of Old Believers.

[7] Pentikäinen, Raudalainen 1999: 91–92. Today, the majority of Estonian Orthodox congregations celebrate their church holidays according to the new calendar and the majority of the Russian Orthodox congregations, as well as Old Believers, still observe the old church calendar.

[8] According to the census of 1934 there were 874,026 Lutherans (78.2% of the population), 207,488 Orthodox (18.4%) and 8,752 Baptists (0.8%) in Estonia. In comparison to the year 1897, the number of Orthodox had increased mainly due to the incorporation of the territories of Petserimaa and the ones behind the Narva River, which were inhabited predominantly by the Orthodox, into the Republic of Estonia (see Plaat 2001: 148).

[9] The number 10,000 referred to in the article by Pentikäinen and Raudalainen is based on the estimate given by W. Hollberg, a researcher of Old Believers. In 1939, approximately 100,000 Old Believers were supposed to have lived in Latvia and about 80,000 – in Lithuania (1999: 84, 95). In 1939, there were 88 congregations of Old Believers in Latvia. From among the other bigger denominations, Lutherans in Latvia had 319, Catholics – 194, Orthodox – 166 and Baptists – 108 congregations (Goeckel 1995: 204).

The religious and cultural life of Old Believers in *Prichudie* gained impetus in the 1920s–1930s. New centres for worship were built, and their own schools and libraries operated (Pentikäinen, Raudalainen 1999: 92). Local Old Believers maintained close contacts with the spiritual centre of the Baltic Old Believers, the Grebenshchikov congregation in Riga. Gavriil Frolov (1854–1930), an icon painter, was among the most conspicuous local religious leaders. Ponomarjova writes about him as follows:

> „G. Frolov was a "fedoseevets" and therefore his mode of life was severe, monastery style. He wore azyam[10] from youth, never missed a divine service and ate meals twice a day as was ordered in the Old Believer regulations. Only having worshipped, he started to paint an icon and then consecrated it himself. He spent the earned money on the needs of the community and on the purchase of religious books. G. Frolov gave much attention to children. He taught the old "kriukovoe"[11] chant to several generations. He founded the school to teach Church Slavonic reading and writing. There were G. Frolov's icons in every Prichudie house. He did not give up painting while being very ill. G. Frolov found the means to build the Old Believer church in Raiushi (Raia) and decorated it himself."[12] (Ponomarjova 1999: 40–41.)

Old Believers' knowledge of Estonian was generally quite good and their attitude towards Estonian Lutherans was tolerant. Some researchers have claimed that, during the period of independence, the majority of the *Prichudie* Old Believers identified themselves more with Estonians than with their Orthodox compatriots (Kurs, Berg 1998: 63). More and more Estonian loan words came into the Old Believers' archaic Russian. According to Paul Ariste, in the 1920s–1930s, *Prichudie* Old Believers regarded themselves rather as Christians than as Russians (Berg, Kulu

[10] Old Believers have special worship clothes. *Azyam* is a long men's wear with narrow sleeves, made of dark fabric. Not all parishioners had *azyams*, but a mentor had it necessarily (Ponomarjova 1999: 37).

[11] Even today some Baltic Old Believers can sing *kriuki*, an ancient form of notation of ecclesiastical chants (Pentikäinen, Raudalainen 1999: 92).

[12] Icons in Raja chapel were in the old Russian icon-painting style. The multilevel iconostasis included about two hundred images of saints and Bible stories. One of the most well-known students of Frolov was Pimen Sofronov (1898–1973), who worked in an icon-painting workshop in Riga in the late 1920s (Ponomarjova 1999: 41).

1996: 1176). It seems that the attitude towards Estonian Lutherans was even more favorable than towards Orthodox Russians. They rather acknowledged the principles of other Christians than those of the Orthodox (so-called Nikonians). Yet, the Old Believers' sense of "selectivity" and mission, and their own peculiar faith, did not allow them the merging with either Estonians or with Orthodox Russians. This was also fostered by the Old Believers' prohibition to marry a person from another faith. It was not so much the nationality but the faith that was still the main foundation for Old Believers' identity in Estonia. Yet, at least according to the census data, the number of Old Believers was much smaller so far than it had been supposed to be.

The relatively peaceful existence of Old Believers in the Republic of Estonia (except for the so-called calendar conflict in the 1930s) was interrupted in 1940, when the era of the five decades of occupation started.

Old Believers in the period of Soviet and German occupation (1940–1991)

In June 1940, the Soviet Army occupied the territory of the Republic of Estonia and it was annexed to the Soviet Union in August. The Soviet suppression of churches and congregations, and religion as a phenomenon opposed to the official atheist ideology, gathered force in Estonia. The new authorities set out to restrict the activities of all congregations in Estonia; the property of the congregations was nationalized, religious publications were banned and the libraries of many congregations were destroyed. Child and youth education, missionary work and foreign relations of churches and congregations were forbidden. In addition, the new authorities persecuted the clergy. From the very beginning of the occupation period, the more outstanding religious activists of various congregations began to disappear.

All this also had its influence on the congregations of Old Believers. Ponomarjova described the first year of Soviet occupation in the area of Old Believers as follows,

> "Old Believers were unpleasantly struck by open anti-religious propaganda. The connections with the Grebenshchikov community ceased almost completely. I. N. Zavoloko, a prominent Old Believer figure, had been reported arrested.[13] All local culture-educational societies were abolished. The great part of local Russian leaders was subjected to repression. During these troubled times, Prichudie people lost their spiritual leaders." (Ponomarjova 1999: 43.)

World War II entailed the occupation of Estonia by Nazi Germany in 1941–1944. Even under wartime circumstances, the new power brought some relief to several Estonian churches and congregations. According to Lembit Raid, who wrote from the position of atheism, Old Believers were persecuted by the occupation authorities (1978: 158), yet, according to Ponomarjova, Germans did not pursue Old Believers. At times the Old Believers, with their customary large beards, were suspected to be Russian partisans, but when they identified themselves, the Germans set them free. Many of the Old Believers were also mobilized into the German army.[14]

In 1944, *Prichudie* turned into a bloody battlefield. In Mustvee town and Raja village, many houses were destroyed in the war. The chapels in Raja and Kükita were burnt down as well as the building for worship in Tartu (Ponomarjova 1999: 43).

After the re-occupation of Estonia by the Soviet Union in 1944, the arrests and deportations, among the families of leading religious activists, which had started in Estonia in 1940–1941, continued until the 1950s. The war and repression of occupation authorities brought about great losses in the membership of all Estonian denominations, including Old Believers.

Besides that, the NKVD (later KGB) officials, dealing with religious associations and laws of the Soviet Union, started to restrict the activities of congregations. In order to deal with all the non-Orthodox confessions, the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults of the Soviet Union was founded in Moscow in 1944, and in Estonia the Estonian Commissioner of the Council was appointed. The Commissioner's main task was to supervise the activities of congregations and their personnel policy. Johannes Kivi, a NKVD reserve officer, was the first to start work as a commissioner at the beginning of 1945. He had to deal with all the

[13] The historian and writer Ivan Zavoloko (1897–1984) founded the Old Believers' circle of enthusiasts whose aim was to study and propagate Russian history and the history of Old Believers. From 1927 to 1933, the magazine "Native Past" (*Rodnaia Starina*) was published in Riga using Zavoloko's personal means and donations. Considerable attention, in this magazine, was also given to the Old Believers in Estonia. Zavoloko himself regularly also visited Old Believers villages in *Prichudie* (Ponomarjova 1999: 40).

[14] As in 1941 Germans occupied Tartu quite quickly, there was no time left to mobilize most of the *Prichudie* men to the Soviet Army before the Germans came. The ones, who had not been mobilized into the Red Army, were, by force, now drafted into the German Army (Ponomarjova 1999: 43).

denominations of Estonia (including Old Believers), except for the Orthodox, for whom a special commissioner was appointed (see: Altnurme 2000: 35 ff.; Plaat 2001: 186 ff.)

The attitude towards different religious groups in Estonia was designed from Moscow, where the Estonian commissioners were given guidelines for their work. Old Believers were regarded as not dangerous by the authorities and this saved them from very severe repression in the post-war period. For instance, in 1947–1948 all the religious organizations in the Soviet Union (except for the Russian Orthodox Church) were divided into four groups according to their allegiance. The first, most loyal group also included, besides Muslims, the Armenian Church and Evangelical Christians-Baptists, the Old Believers.[15]

However, Old Believers in Estonia were also penalized by several restrictions, and they had to go through all the most important restructuring in the religious life of the Soviet Union, which was carried out by the local party, government and security organs, under the leadership of the Commissioner for the Affairs of Religious Cults.

One of the first tasks of the Soviet authorities was to register congregations, which gave them an operating permit. In early 1945, the commissioner Johannes Kivi was given an order from Moscow to start registering the Estonian congregations. By the end of 1945, the Estonian congregations had submitted 388 registration applications, 11 of them by the congregations of Old Believers. From among the Estonian clergy that Commissioner Kivi had registered by July 1, 1946, nine were Old Believers' mentors (ERA, f. R-1989, n. 2, s. 3, l. 49–50, 84). The commissioner had largely completed the registration process by 1947. A great number of Estonian congregations, despite having had applied, were never registered; yet, the 11 Old Believers' congregations were.[16]

According to the estimates of the Commissioner for the Affairs of Religious Cults, the number of Old Believers decreased considerably

[15] The second group included Lutherans and the Reformed Church, the third one – Roman Catholics and Uniates, and the fourth – the underground "sectarians" (Altnurme 2000: 25–26, 30).

[16] In Estonia, independent legal activities were carried on during the Soviet period (up to the 1980s) only by the eight denominations which were officially registered in the 1940s: Lutheran, Orthodox, Catholic and Methodist Churches; Jewish, Old Believers' and the Seventh-Day Adventists' congregations; and the Evangelical Christian and Baptist Union, which comprised free congregations that acted independently before the Soviet period.

during the Soviet period, as was also the case with the other Estonian religious groups. The relevant statistics can be found in the Archive of the Commissioner for the Affairs of Religious Cults (ACARC) and is, as a rule, reliable, being based on the data presented by the congregations themselves. At the same time, the existence of these data is very different by confessions. In 1951, commissioner Kivi complained that it was not possible to figure out the exact number of Old Believers in Estonia, as they do not keep an accurate count. According to Kivi, Old Believers were mostly old people.[17] Differently from the Lutheran Church and Estonian free congregations, whose members and activities were precisely recorded, this kind of deficiency of data about Old Believers in the materials of the ACARC lasted until the termination of the commissioner's institution in 1990. The same also applies to the two denominations – Catholic and Jewish – entrusted under the "care" of the commissioner. There are more data about the number of Old Believers beginning from the early 1960s, when the membership of almost all the denominations in Estonia started to decline. This was largely due to the success of the atheist campaign launched in the late 1950s.

Table 1. Number of Old Believers in the Estonian SSR in 1961–1989.[18]

1961	1965	1970	1975	1985	1987	1989
1,600	1,500	900	750	600	600	600

In comparison with the census of 1934, in which 5,276 people in Estonia determined themselves as Old Believers by their faith (Risch 1937: 122, 133), by the mid-1980s the membership of the Old Believers' congregations had decreased by almost nine times according to the data of the Commissioner for the Affairs of Religious Cults. The decline in the membership of Old Believers' congregations from 1,600 in 1961 to 600 in 1989 was one of the largest in Estonia in this period.[19]

[17] ERAF, f. 1, n. 1–72, s. 26, l. 60–61. In the light of this statement it is difficult to estimate the data of the "Estonian Board for Religious Affairs" presented in the article by Berg and Kulu, according to which as late as in 1946 the 11 Estonian Old Believers' congregations comprised 5,806 people (1996: 1169).

[18] The table has been drawn up on the basis of ACARC, PSO, 1976, d. 201, l. 94–95; 1990, d. 344, l. 60; OS, 1986, d. 3, l. 77 ff.; 1988, d. 3-1, l. 138 ff.; 1990, d. 3, l. 5 ff.

[19] See also Plaat 2001: 221.

However, the figures presented in the table have to be regarded critically. The figures for Old Believers are a rough estimate and, as can be deduced by the round numbers in the table, they cannot be considered as very exact. Most probably these are the estimated total numbers of the people who visited Old Believers' worship buildings in Estonia during great religious feasts.[20]

It must also be taken into account that many believers concealed their connection with congregations, especially after the strengthening of the anti-religious fight, which had started in the late 1950s. Many people did not dare to go to church even on great religious holidays, being afraid of the inspection trips of the representatives of local authorities/informers to churches and the following repression. According to Ponomarjova, Old Believers in Estonia did not really advertise their belonging to the church. Especially in the case of men this could ruin their careers. It was mainly women and elderly people who, in the Soviet period, frequented buildings for worship and often children were also taken along (1999: 44).

On the other hand, it is quite probable that, as was the case with all the other bigger faiths in Estonia, the membership of Old Believers' congregations, in the Soviet time, diminished considerably. The fact, that men and young people detached themselves from Old Believers' congregations, was not so much due to the necessity to conceal their belief, but, similar to the rest of Estonia, the wide spread of secularization in the Old Believers' society. Old people and women also constituted the majority of the faithful membership of their congregations in the other bigger religions in Estonia. By 1987, the actual membership of Estonian denominations had decreased below 5% of the total population of the Estonian SSR. The percentage of the regular churchgoers of all denominations, from the total population of Estonia, had by that time probably decreased below 1% (see Plaat 2001: 221–223).

The relatively small numbers of Old Believers given in Table 1 are still reliable as indicators of the membership more openly and actively related

[20] It is the numbers of those visiting church during the great religious feasts that the ACARC has quoted as the membership of the Orthodox, Catholic and Jewish congregations. For instance, in 1987 the commissioner has quoted as the numbers for the membership of the Orthodox, Catholic and Jewish congregations the estimate number of those visiting churches during the great religious feasts – 13,980, 400 and 160 people, respectively (ACARC, OS, 1988, d. 3-1, l. 138 ff.). Most probably the same method was also used when quoting the number of Old Believers.

to their congregations. The rapid decline in the number of Old Believers, in the 1960s–1970s, is also very likely.[21] All the "old" Estonian denominations (Lutherans, Orthodox, Baptists, Free Believers, etc.) underwent a rapid decline in their active membership in the 1960s–1970s and Old Believers are probably not an exception here. The number of Old Believers quoted in the statistics of the ACARC would diminish even more if we consider, as active membership, only those who regularly go to worship. For instance, according to the report of the commissioner from 1976, 75–80% of the members of the Orthodox, Catholic and Old Believers' Churches were indifferent and that the churches were almost empty on ordinary Sundays.[22] Probably, in the 1970s–1980s, in Estonia only around one hundred Old Believers went to church regularly every Sunday.

Interviews with Old Believers also testify to the sharp decline in the number of churchgoers, ageing of the participants in services and falling into oblivion of the old religious customs in the Soviet time. From among the customs inherent to Old Believers, keeping the fast, confessing to *nastavnik* and baptizing decreased considerably during the Soviet period. In addition, the tradition of *christoslavy* (glorifying of Christ), when after the Christmas service the preceptor and the *krylos* (choir) go all round the Old Believers' village glorifying Christ in every house, faded gradually. The former prohibition against smoking and consuming alcohol is not strictly valid any more, either, although until today people are not allowed to smoke in most Old Believers' houses. Also, the Old Believers' habit of using different dishes, for their own purpose, and others for alien people, has almost disappeared.[23]

[21] This seems to be indirectly confirmed also by the fact that in 1990, when on the crest of the "singing revolution" there was no special need to show the real number of believers smaller than it was and the corresponding reports were no longer sent to Moscow, the number of Old Believers in the report for 1989 has remained the same. However, this can also be due to the lack of new data.

[22] In comparison, it can be mentioned that the reports of the 1970s on the regular churchgoers in the Lutheran Church quoted as the number of regular churchgoers constantly only 5–10% of the donating members of the Lutheran Church (ACARC, OS, 1977, d. 1, l. 86 ff.; d. 2, l. 18-21).

[23] Having visited the Old Believers' villages on Lake Peipsi in 1930, "Paul Ariste wrote: "There are special dishes for people of other faith in every decent house since politeness demands hospitality." There was also a separate cup for a new mother in Old Believer families. A man who returned home from other places used separate dishes until he was cleansed with prayer. Sharing the same dishes with Orthodox people was regarded as a sin, but it sometimes happened while being away from home." (Ponomarjova 1999: 39).

Secular funerals also became more popular in the Soviet period. Yet, in the late 1960s about 80% of the deceased in Kallaste were still buried by the Old Believers' preceptor (*s batkoi*) and only in 20% of cases the funeral was secular (*s muzykoi*) (Richter 1969: 60). Similarly to the other denominations in Estonia, the funeral was one of the most significant Old Believers' rites performed in the 1960s–1980s. Yet, in comparison to the rest of Estonia of the Soviet period, secular funeral has assumed less prevalence in the Old Believers' area. For Old Believers, a church funeral has held a special meaning, if not even the most important tradition.[24]

The divergence of Old Believers from their faith and the fading of old rituals were also confirmed by a research conducted by Yelizaveta Richter in 1966. The investigation of 70 families of Kallaste town involved 170 respondents (aged 17 and older). Most of them came from the families of fishermen and descendants of *Pomortsy*. The main results of this research were as follows. A typical feature of the population of Kallaste in 1966 was the indifference to religion and to the dogmas preached by *nastavniks*. The problems of the religious morale had lost their former significance and people did no longer observe the strict prescriptions concerning the norms of conduct. The chapel of Old Believers in town had lost its predominant role in the life of town which it had enjoyed before the Soviet times, when religion strongly influenced the whole way of life in Kallaste ("religion was the law for everyone"). At the same time, the former isolation of the Old Believers from adherents to other religions had disappeared according to Richter.

In every age set investigated in 1966,[25] women were more religious than men. The sharp decline of religiousness started in the groups of respondents younger than 46 years. The most religious people were older than 56 and even among them most respondents did not observe all the rules prescribed by their religion. For instance, they did not fast and went

[24] Ponomarjova wrote: "A burial was the most significant of rites. Before a burial three or four men read in turn psalms beside the deceased. Usually all village inhabitants and acquaintances of the deceased, from neighbouring villages, came to a burial. An icon was carried in front of a coffin, the coffin was covered by cloth, the preceptor with a censer followed the coffin. There was a commemorative feast for the preceptor, relatives and neighbours after a burial. There was a custom to worship, to hold commemorative services in the third, ninth and fortieth day after a death." (1999: 39). Old Believers have mostly preserved these funeral rituals until today.

[25] Richter, in her analysis, divided the informants into four age groups: 17–32, 33–45, 46–55-year-olds and those aged 56 and older (1969: 56).

to chapel only on great feasts. In the group of respondents older than 56 years, 25% of men and 32% of women attended chapel regularly[26] and 13% of men and 12% of women kept fasts regularly.[27] According to Richter, only the latter can be called "god's people", because they regularly kept fasts, confessed to *batyushka*, attended clerical services, lit the icon-lamp in the holy corner of their houses and wanted their grandchildren to be baptized. Some of them did not watch TV, since it was "connected with the Antichrist".

The results of this research are reliable, although here we have to take into consideration the fact that this period was hostile towards religion, when only articles dealing with the triumph of atheism were published. Richter has mostly elicited these percentages that reflected the decline of religiousness. When showing the decreasing importance of religion, Richter, nevertheless, claimed that in Kallaste "the significance of the clerical rites is relatively considerable" (see Richter 1969).

The results of the Kallaste study could probably be viewed as also applying to Old Believers' settlements on the coast of Lake Peipsi. In the Soviet time, a great part of the Estonian Old Believers resided in the towns of Kallaste and Mustvee. In 1985, for instance, according to the data of the Commissioner for the Affairs of Religious Cults almost one half of the Estonian Old Believers lived in towns and urban settlements (ACARC, OS, 1986, t. 3, l. 77–78), i.e., mostly in Kallaste, Mustvee, Tallinn and Tartu.

In conclusion, it can be said that in the Soviet time the number of those faithful to Old Beliefs decreased and their average age increased rapidly. The main reasons for that were the successful anti-religious struggle in the Soviet Union, young people's leaving *Prichudie* settlements for towns and losing contacts with their congregations[28] as well as the rapid

[26] From among the 170 respondents, 27 persons (16%) were regular churchgoers. At the same time, Richter claimed that actually only 10–16 elderly persons participated in the service on ordinary Sundays (1969: 57).

[27] Here Richter probably means the persons who regularly kept all the Old Believers' fasts (*rozhdestvenskii*, *uspenskii* and Lent, as well as weekly Wednesday and Friday fasts). In the younger groups of respondents nobody kept fasts regularly (see Richter 1969: 56). Yet, more people kept fasts once a year.

[28] In 1996 Berg and Kulu wrote that during the past twenty years the number of inhabitants on Piirissaar Island had decreased by three and in Peipsiääre rural municipality by two times and in Raja rural municipality and in Kallaste about 20%. In 1989, elderly people in Peipsiääre rural municipality constituted 42% and on Piirissaar Island even 88% of the whole population (1996: 1170–1171).

secularization process that took place in Estonian society. Yet, Old Believers were able to survive the Soviet period, their congregations were not closed down and their *nastavniks* worked in most of them. While in 1938 twelve Old Believers' congregations had altogether eight *nastavniks*, then in 1976 eleven congregations had seven *nastavniks* (that year all over Estonia 363 congregations with 231 clergymen operated altogether). In 1976, the average age of *nastavniks* was very high – 73 years (the average age of Estonian clergymen was 60 years). In comparison we might mention that, in 1976, the Orthodox Church had 51 priests for 86 congregations and the number of Orthodox congregations had fallen by approximately three times in comparison to the year 1938. In addition to that fact, in 1987 Pühtitsa Nunnery of the Russian Orthodox Church operated with 148 residents (see Plaat 2001: 446-447).

It is an interesting and little known fact that in the Soviet time Old Believers had an operating, partly underground, *skit* (Old Believers' monastery) in Raja village. As is revealed in the interview of Zossima Iotkin, the long-time mentor of Raja congregation, to the author, the local authorities just closed their eyes to the fact and let the monastery operate in peace, without reporting about it to the central authorities. The monastery operated in a house next to the chapel that had been burnt down in wartime. At present, the same house is also used for holding services.[29] The tower of Raja chapel was restored by the congregation in 1990. By that year, freedom of religion had been established in Estonia, which happened due to the so-called singing revolution of the late 1980s.

Old Believers in the Republic of Estonia (1991–2004)

After the revolutionary events in Estonian society, which in 1991 resulted in the regaining of independence of the Republic of Estonia, religious life in Estonia has again returned to normal. During the registration of churches and congregations, in the first half of the 1990s, the Union of Old Believer Parishes of Estonia was also re-established and registered. As formerly, it comprises eleven congregations, nine of them in *Prichudie* (Mustvee, Raja, Kükita, Kallaste, Väike-Kolkja, Suur-Kolkja, Kasepää, Varnja, Piirissaar) and one both in Tallinn and Tartu. Besides the Raja congregation, all of them have their own chapels. Yet, many of them have been plundered during the past decades. [30]

[29] Interview: Zossima Iotkin – J. Plaat 1995: Raja village, Jõgeva County.

From the 1990s onwards it is possible to talk about the Old Believer revival in Estonia. The Old Believers of Estonia strive for the revival of old traditions. Many Old Believers' descendants willingly baptize their children in worship centers. Old Believers' chapels are crowded at Easter. Their activities have been fostered by the Society of Old Believer Culture and Development founded in Tartu in 1998, as well as several other organizations aiming at the development of *Prichudie*. Old Believers' congregations have jointly celebrated the days of their home churches in different villages. For instance, the feast of apostles Paul and Peter was celebrated on Piirissaar Island in 1999. The tradition of *christoslavy* (glorifying of Christ after the Christmas night service) is being revived. At Kolkja School Old Believers' children have classes on religious topics.

However, this revival can be regarded rather as an outward indication of respecting traditions, under the conditions of the re-established freedom of religion, and not as a sign of religious upheaval. Old Believers do not pay special attention to missionary work and the active membership of congregations has not increased considerably in the 1990s and early 21st century. Most of the baptized Old Believers go to buildings for worship only during great religious feasts. The interviews conducted with the more active Old Believers in 2003 testify to the fact that the extinction of Old Believers' traditions, due to the death of the older generation and elderly *batyushkas*, is quite real.[31]

In this light, we should critically consider the statement presented on the home page of Estonian Old Believers claiming that "Now there are almost 15 thousand Old Believers by birth in Estonia."[32] This figure can definitely not be considered as the number of Old Believers by faith.

Numerical data about Old Believers have been sketchy and also often unreliable during the independence period. In 1995, the Department of

[30] Varnja, Kolkja, Kallaste, Mustvee, Kükita and Tartu worshipping buildings have been broken into and icons have been stolen, in some of them even several times. In several churches, there are empty spaces in iconostases, where the stolen icons were.

[31] These interviews were conducted during the ethnological survey in 2003 in Kolkja, Kasepää and Varnja villages. This field work in *Prichudie* Old Believers area constitutes a part of the ethnological and sociological survey project "The Subcultures of the Estonian Russians, Old Believers and other non-Estonians in East-Virumaa and Lake Peipsi Region from 1940 to 2005" financed by the Estonian Science Foundation.

[32] See www.starover.ee/kirikud.html.

Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs asked all Estonian denominations for their membership data. The figure for Old Believers – 10,000 – presented by the Ministry of Internal Affairs is clearly exaggerated if we bear in mind the actual membership of Old Believers' congregations. As of January 1 2000, according to the data from the Department of Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs there were 5,000[33] Old Believers (see Au, Ringvee 2000: 140–141).

According to the research of Berg and Kulu, by the census of 1989, 3,500 Old Believers' descendants might have lived in the Peipsi-Russian area (Mustvee and Kallaste towns and Raja, Peipsiääre and Piirissaare rural municipalities), and they constitute the "present core of the Old Believers' descendants". Even from them in the 1990s only "elderly, mostly retired people, above all, women" were the carriers of Old Belief (1996: 1170, 1178). This estimation is probably much nearer to the truth, as is also the opinion of Pentikäinen and Raudalainen that in the 1990s the number of *Prichudie* Old Believers might have been approximately 2,000–2,500 (1999: 86).

The 2000 Population Census of Estonia, which asked the question "What is your religious affiliation?"[34] offers us the most reliable figures about the number of those considering themselves as Old Believers by faith (not by culture or by origin). The options given at the census were as follows: 1) follower of a particular faith, 2) has no religious affiliation, 3) atheist, 4) cannot define affiliation, 5) refused to answer. The followers of a particular faith had to indicate their faith. At the census of 2000, 2,515 inhabitants of Estonia (0.2% of those who answered the question about faith) determined themselves as Old Believers. There were 2,390 Russians (95%), 91 Estonians and 34 representatives of other nations among Old Believers.[35] Six faiths in Estonia had more adherents than Old Believers

[33] Probably it is a misprint, as in 1998 the Department of Religious Affairs quotes the membership of Old Believers' congregations as 500 (*A ja O...* 1999: 340). Yet, this figure as the active membership of Old Believers' congregations is considerably more realistic than 5,000.

[34] The census data are taken from: *2000. aasta...* 2001: 78–79; *2000. aasta...* 2002: 17–19, 316–322, 328; www.stat.ee.

[35] The proportion of Old Believers among non-Estonians has decreased considerably due to the Soviet-time mass immigration. Also the number of Old Believers compared to the Estonian Orthodox is negligible. According to the 2000 census 351,178 Russians lived in Estonia, which constituted as the largest group of non-Estonians 25.6% of the population. From among the Russians who answered the question about faith, 38.5% or 104,698 persons determined themselves as Orthodox.

(Lutherans, Orthodox, Baptists, Catholics, Jehovah's Witnesses and Pentecostalists[36]).

Here we have to bear in mind that answering the question about faith was optional.[37] Also only 15-year-olds and older people answered this question. The number of Estonian Old Believers would be considerably bigger if we took into account all the baptized Old Believer children and also those who were once baptized, but have drifted away from religion and also expressed their indifference towards it at the census.

Among 2,515 adult Old Believers, there were 1,497 women and 1,018 men. 1,035 of them lived in rural settlements and 1,480 – in towns (483 in Tartu, 275 in Tallinn, and the rest of them mainly in Kallaste, Mustvee and East-Virumaa towns). From the counties, Tartumaa had the largest number of Old Believers (1,472, apart from Tartu and Kallaste also in Peipsiääre and Piirissaare rural municipalities[38]). It was followed by Jõgevamaa (600, in Mustvee and Kasepää rural municipalities[39]), Harjumaa (282, mainly in Tallinn) and East-Virumaa (108). If we leave out the town of Tartu, then approximately 1500 adult Old Believers lived on the coast of Lake Peipsi (in Tartumaa and Jõgevamaa counties).

When speaking about the educational level, it is conspicuous that, in comparison to other confessions, among the 2,515 Old Believers the percentage of those without basic education and with only basic education is the highest (23.6% and 28.6%, respectively). From the rest of the Old Believers, 31.7% have secondary education, 10.2% – secondary special education and 4.5% – higher education.

[36] 152,237 persons at the age of 15 and older determined themselves as Lutherans and 143,554 persons – as Orthodox (14.8% and 13.9% of those who answered the question about faith, respectively). The percentage of the other confessions among the respondents remained below 0.6. Russians constituted 72.9% of the Estonian Orthodox. Among those who admitted to be Orthodox, the percentage of Estonians was 12.9 (see in more detail: Plaat 2002: 103–104).

[37] 8.1% of the population of Estonia did not answer the optional question about faith. It can be presumed that, while doing so, the majority of them expressed their indifference towards religion. 1890 persons considered themselves as followers of a particular faith, but did not specify it. If we take into account the whole population of Estonia, then the followers of a particular faith would constitute 23.9 %, from among those who answered the question about faith, the followers of a particular faith constituted 31.8 %.

[38] In 2000, 992 people lived in Peipsiääre rural municipality (of whom 9% were Estonians) and 104 in Piirissaare rural municipality (17% of them were Estonians).

[39] In 2000, 1418 people lived in Kasepää rural municipality (40% of them were Estonians). In this rural municipality, the number of Old Believers was largest in Raja village, whose population was 478 (10% of them Estonians).

The traditional Old Believers' centers, Kallaste and Mustvee, were the only towns in Estonia where believers constituted more than 50% of the adult population: in Kallaste – 62.5% (600 persons from the 961 who answered the question about faith) and in Mustvee – 50.5% (710 persons from the 1,406 respondents).[40] In Mustvee, the numbers for Old Believers and Orthodox were almost equal (17.3% and 17.7%, respectively), and Lutherans constituted 14.5%. In Kallaste, the percentage of Old Believers was 35.6, that of Orthodox – 18 and that of Lutherans – 7.3.

The fact that Kallaste and Mustvee were towns with the greatest proportion of believers was due to the high percentage of Russian population and the existence of both the Orthodox and Old Believers in these towns. The results of the 2000 census indicate clearly that the Russians living in Estonia are far more religious than Estonians.[41] The rule that the greater is the proportion of Russians, the greater is the percentage of religious people also applies to other Estonian towns.[42] The greatest proportion of religious people in Estonian counties was in East-Virumaa (40.4%), where the proportion of Russians and other non-Estonians is the highest, compared to all the other counties in Estonia.

The greater religiousness of Russians is above all related to the popularity of Orthodoxy among the Russian population (if we compare it to Lutheranism among Estonians). However, it can probably also be maintained about Estonian Old Believers that the proportion of believers among them is much greater than among Estonians. In comparison to Lutheran Estonians, the number of those, who determined themselves as Old Believers at the census, does not seem to be so small any more.

Russians constituted as much as 95% of the Old Believers in 2000, and indirectly this testifies to the fact that the former endogamous way of life,

[40] Together with the ones who did not answer the question about faith, there were 986 people (15-year-olds and older) in Kallaste and 1,424 in Mustvee.

[41] Nearly all the sociological surveys carried out in the 1990s also reveal that in comparison to Estonians, the Russians and other non-Estonians who live in Estonia are considerably more religious, at least as regards connection with traditional Christianity (see: Plaat 2000, 2002, 2003).

[42] The next ones on the list were - with also predominantly Russian-speaking population - Narva-Jõesuu (48.5% of the respondents were religious), Kohtla-Järve (42.9%), Maardu (42.8%), Jõhvi (42.7%), Narva (40.8%) and also Võru, which is the first town on the list with predominantly Estonian-speaking population (35.8%). Due to the great number of Russians, Tallinn with 35.5% was also above the Estonian average (34%).

when Old Believers married only within their own faith, has survived to a certain extent even up to now. Mixed marriages are still rare among those who determine themselves as Old Believers. Differentiation from other confessions has also been preserved until now. Berg and Kulu point out how Russians, in Old Believers' villages and towns on Lake Peipsi, distinguish between the "own" and the "alien". Not only Estonians, but the Russians who came from afar, the Orthodox Russians, and atheists are alien (1996: 1177).

Yet, it does not mean that Old Believers have a negative attitude towards other nations. For instance, their attitude towards Estonians throughout the 20th century has rather been more benevolent than hostile. Hopefully the same could be said about Estonians, whose attitude towards the singular ethnic group, who have resided in Estonia for centuries, has usually been more favourable than towards the Russians who settled here in the Soviet time. Attitude towards the Old Believers' religion has also been favourable, although no difference can be made with Orthodoxy, which has spread widely in Estonia since the middle of the 19th century. The latter can be claimed on the basis of a sociological survey of religion, which was conducted in seven Estonian counties in 1996–2002.[43] Besides other topics, the respondents were asked to express their attitude towards Estonian denominations, if they agreed to do it and knew something about the denominations mentioned in the list (30 in all). On a 1–6 scale the highest estimation was given to the Lutheran Church (average 5.3). This was followed by the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church (4.4), the Russian Orthodox Church in Estonia[44] (4.3) and – ranging as the fourth – Old Believers (4.0). All the other confessions lagged behind, with 3.9 points Old Believers were followed by the presumably popular *Taara* and Earth Faith and the Roman Catholic Church.

Until today religion has served as the main basis for Old Believers'

[43] In this study supervised by J. Plaat 17-year-olds and older people selected by random choice were questioned in seven counties.

[44] In the research, this name was given to the Orthodox Church, which unites predominantly Russian congregations and was registered only in 2002 under the subordination of Moscow Patriarchate. This was done in order to differentiate them from the EAOC congregations with predominantly Estonian membership, under the subordination of Constantinople.

identity,[45] yet, its role in their identity has diminished considerably since the Soviet period. Also great differences between generations have developed here. In the lives of those born in the 1960s and later, the Old Belief has lost its significance and by their attitudes young or middle-aged people, who come from Old Believers' families, are becoming closer and closer to other Estonian Russians. Their identity is rather ethno-linguistic than religious. The aforementioned process is also confirmed by the younger generation's considerably poorer knowledge of Estonian in comparison to the Old Believers of older generations. Most of the latter can speak Estonian well. Nowadays the main carriers of Old Belief are the older generation and women (see Berg, Kulu 1996: 1172–1173, 1176–1178). For them, religion still seems to be the basis for their identity. At the same time, it is mainly elderly people and women who have already maintained Old Believers' traditions for decades[46] , and supposedly many young people, who come from Old Believers' families, will resume their ancestors' faith when they become older.

Summary

Russian Old Believers immigrated to Estonia starting from the late 17th century and established their permanent settlements on the western coast of Lake Peipsi in the 18th century. They have lived there until today, not mixing with the local Lutheran Estonians and Orthodox and non-believers-Russians. Differentiating between "own" and "alien" by faith has helped Old Believers to preserve their cultural identity until the present time. Up to the 2nd half of the 20th century, religion served as the basis of identity for most *Prichudie* Old Believers; after that younger generations started to gradually secede from their ancestors' religion. In the past few decades, it has mainly been the older generation of Old Believers that has actively adhered to religion. For the younger and middle-aged people, ethnic and linguistic identity has acquired more significance. The aforementioned has assisted in breaking down the still existing barrier

[45] According to the survey conducted in 1994–1995, 40% of the Lake Peipsi Old Believers considered their faith very important and 41% regarded it as important, whereas 60% maintained that their families revealed either very or fairly characteristic features of Old Believers (Berg, Kulu 1996: 1177).

[46] About the greater religiousness of elderly people and women see, e.g., Plaat 2001: 317–318, 368–370.

between Old Believers and other Estonian Russians, Orthodox and non-believers (*Sovetskie*), who immigrated to Estonia in the Soviet period. The isolation of Old Believers has also been disintegrated by the emigration of young people from *Prichudie* settlements to Estonian towns in the 2nd half of the 20th century. In the course of time, the attitude of Old Believers towards other Russians has become more tolerant, whereas, as a rule, at least in the 20th century Estonians have enjoyed a positive attitude among them (and also vice versa).

Changes in Old Believers' demographic situation are related to their religious and cultural identity. In the 18th–19th centuries, the majority of Old Believers were confirmed adherents of Old Belief – Orthodoxy which was practised before Patriarch Nikon's reforms. Old Believers' numbers in *Prichudie* increased especially in the 19th century. By 1855, it amounted to 3,278 and also kept growing in the following decades. In the 20th century, the number of those Old Believers' descendants, who do not identify themselves as religious Old Believers, but whose cultural identity is related to Old Believers' culture and who might also be baptized as Old Believers, has gradually increased. While, in the 1920s–1930s, different researchers estimated the number of Estonian Old Believers to be 8,000–10,000, then at censuses slightly over 5,000 people (including children) determined their religion as the Old Belief. At the census of 2000, 2,515 adult citizens of Estonia regarded themselves as followers of the Old Belief. This number is, by far, passed by the different figures offered by Old Believers themselves, which denoted "Old Believers by birth" and amount up to 15,000. Yet, if we take into account the Old Believers who frequent worshipping buildings and observe the most important rituals, this 2,500 can also be an overestimate. Today, the majority of active Old Believers is constituted by elderly women, as was also the case in the Soviet time. In the early 1960s, approximately 1,600 and in the 2nd half of the 1980s about 600 people went to Old Believers' worshipping places in Estonia during great religious feasts. Supposedly this number is not remarkably bigger nowadays than it was at the low point of the 1980s. Since the Soviet period, the number of those who regularly participate in Sunday services and confessions, keep fasts and observe other Old Believers' rituals has been even several times less.

Changes in Old Believers' identity and demographic situation have also been related to the attitude of authorities. However, the number of the Old Believers, who were generally used to persecution, did not decrease during the period of severe repression in the 19th century, but rather increased. It was the secularization of society that had a stronger impact on

the religiousness of Old Believers in the 20th century than state power. As a result, the number of active Old Believers has diminished gradually, especially since the Soviet period, when the authorities' anti-religious policy fostered secularization. However, a substantial turn in the religiousness of Old Believers cannot either be detected in the independent Republic of Estonia, under the conditions of freedom of religion. What might be noticed in the last decade is the strengthening of Old Believers' cultural identity, which, at great religious feasts, rallies hundreds of Old Believers from all over Estonia. Also, many of the descendants of Old Believers, who are actually not really religious any more, from time to time participate in great religious feasts, identify themselves with Old Believers' culture and have their children baptized. Hopefully, the singularity of the subculture, which has survived in Estonia for centuries, will be developed also in the European Union, to the integration into which Lake Peipsi Old Believers objected the most in Estonia.

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Latvian 20th Century History from the Perspective of Oral History Sources. The Views of Russians from Eastern Latvia

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In the paper an attempt is made to reveal the notions on history of Russians of Eastern Latvia. Oral history sources, from the collection of the University of Daugavpils, demonstrate their perception of Latvian 20th century history. The major source of historical information is life experience of narrators, on the basis of which they single out the following periods in the 20th century history of Latvia: the time of the First Republic of Latvia; World War II; the years of Stalinism; the period from the late 1950 till 1980; the reconstruction of the independence of Latvia.

The perception, understanding and evaluation of these historical periods mostly depend on the individual peculiarities, social status and political assumption of the narrators, not on their ethnic origin. Because of this, we have to take into consideration the historical notions, common for all 'ordinary' people, and not try to speculate about a 'Russian version' of the history of Latvia.

Keywords: oral history sources, 'ordinary' people, historical notions, historical consciousness, evaluation approach

The history of Latvia in the 20th century is saturated with events that have invited controversial interpretations both by professional historians and the wider community, sometimes reaching extreme points of view. First and foremost, this concerns the most active part of society – people of the age between 20 and 70 who grew up in the 1940–1980s. The formation of the historical awareness of these generations took place in Soviet society and the corresponding informational space, characterised by episodic

teaching of Latvian history at schools, as well as silencing or even falsifying many parts of history. The 'official' version of Latvian history, proposed by the works of historians and circulated by mass media, did not comply with the memories of the relatives and acquaintances who were the actual witnesses of 20th century events. Depending on the individual life situation, people created certain images of Latvian history according to which they would explain the present, predict the future and motivate their own action. It is essential to reveal the whole variety of notions on history of the population of Latvia, including Russians who form a considerable part of Latvian society (Volkovs 1998). The present paper will focus on the notions on history, characteristic of the Russian people of Eastern Latvia.

So far there has been no attempt of making use of oral history sources in order to understand the perception of historical events in Latvia. However, the testimony of 'ordinary' or 'simple' people – the rank and file participants of the historical process, as an alternative to traditional sources, has a greater potential of revealing at least some of the characteristics of general historical consciousness. The present paper makes use of the materials of the oral history collection of the University of Daugavpils (abbreviated – DU MV) which was initiated in 2001 and contains about 250 records. Further citations of the sources will be indicated by an abbreviated designation of the collection and the file number of the recorded interview. The purpose of these sources is to sustain the life story of a concrete person, which has been related by him or herself, and to reclaim the information that is contained in the interview. This is the reason why the narrators made no special selection of the notions on Latvian history, neither did they structure these notions; they appeared along the general process of narration.

The image of the narrators is rather heterogeneous. It is possible to single out different groups of narrators according to their origin, family structure, age, the time and reasons for arrival in Latvia, as well as their national and religious identity. For example, ethnically 'pure' Russians with whom both parents are Russian and the descendants of mixed families where only one parent is Russian, but who relate themselves to the Russian ethnos. Among the representatives of both groups there are those who consider themselves Old Believers, Russian Orthodox, sometimes – Catholics or Lutherans, sometimes they possess no religious identity at all. Regarding the family structure (e.g. having a Latvian spouse) or attendant circumstances (the narrator has known Latvian since childhood, children and/or grandchildren speak Latvian), it is possible to

single out groups of Russians living in a Russian-speaking environment, in a bi-lingual, or Latvian-speaking environment. The research of oral history sources of the collection of the University of Daugavpils does not provide evidence for singling out specific historical notions of any of the groups. Notions of Russians from Eastern Latvia, concerning Latvian 20th century history, differ depending on the respondents' age and the time of their arrival in Latvia: the older the respondents, the more informed, as a rule, they are.

The collected life stories of the Russian population of Eastern Latvia, belonging to the generation that was born in the 1920–30s, provide a possibility of distinguishing some features of the historical notions of this traditional ethnic minority of Latvia (Zavarina 1986; Apine & Volkovs 1998). Their suggested version of Latvian 20th century history does not follow the books, it differs from the accepted conceptions of historiography providing an interpretation of the given period of Latvian history. In the Soviet (see, for instance, Strazdinš 1958; Drīzulis 1986) as well as in national historiography (Bērziņš 2000), many historical events of the 20th century have been excessively politicised. Depending on the aim of either justifying or rejecting the legitimacy of Latvian statehood, the authors have selected and interpreted the facts, giving an obvious priority to political, military, and socio-economical history. It must be kept in mind that the narrators do not manifest a substantial familiarity with the different conceptions of 20th century Latvian history. First, the majority of respondents belong to the generation whose childhood period was in the 1930s and early 1940s when Latvian national historiography was in the stage of formation, whereas the Soviet one was not widespread in the territory of the Republic of Latvia. Many significant events of 20th century history had not yet happened; therefore the respondents could not have internalised the formed notions from school. Second, almost all the respondents have received an education of two to six years, they did not proceed with education after leaving school and did physical work for their whole life; consequently, they did not have an opportunity to receive a complete system of historical notions.

Thus, their major source of historical information is their own life experience. In the life stories of Russians in Latgale, the eastern part of Latvia, 20th century Latvian history appears in personal dimensions, its frame of reference being the individual human's fate, in this case – the fate of the respondents. This is of a special importance at the beginning of the 21st century when history has acknowledged the necessity of breaking free from the captivity of sociological historical constructions and turning to

human history. However, one should not mix the logical constructions of historians, which have been formed as a result of summarising bulky factual evidence, with the vague image of history that emerges in the course of a respondent's narration. Very few narratives contain a premeditated and holistic vision of history. It happens more often that history appears only as the background for the narrator's private life events. Nevertheless, the fragmented sketches and individual remarks give an opportunity of collecting the total vision of history like a mosaic, bringing out several features, common for the majority of sources. What follows is a preliminary reconstruction, needing to be further specified and developed.

The information, gained from the oral history sources, allows reconstructing the succession of qualitatively diverse time spans, existing in the respondents' consciousness, and functions as the basis of the periodisation of 20th century Latvian history. It must be noted that this periodisation does not always correspond to the scholarly one. Hence, as a rule, narrators single out the following periods:

The time of the First Republic of Latvia

It must be noted that not all respondents differentiate between the years of the Parliamentary Republic and the years of Ulmanis' authoritarian rule. For the majority, this whole period is reduced to the 'times of Ulmanis', while others are totally unaware of the political and legislative peculiarities of the given period:

> - […] the coup d'état of Karlis Ulmanis, – was anything known about it? Was it being discussed?
> - Which year it happened?
> - In 1934.
> - Couldn't tell you … [DU MV 45]

However, all respondents identify the 'times of Latvia' – the time of the independent Latvian state before the war. Some interviews reveal memories of the events of 1940 as a certain borderline, followed by sudden changes:

> - So, do you remember that there was the First Republic – Latvia?
> - Independent?
> - Yes.
> - Then Russians came. Occupied Latvia. I remember all that. Objected nothing. [DU MV 46]

However, the majority of respondents tend to identify the Soviet period with the post-war time. Therefore, the year of 1940 and the introduction of the Red Army into the territory of Latvia, as well as the arrival of German troops in 1941, have been contained in the following period:

World War II

After that comes a lengthy period of the Soviet rule (life 'under Communism', 'under the Soviets', 'in the Soviet Union', 'under Stalin' and sometimes – 'under the Russians') that is divided by many narrators into two different parts:

The years of Stalinism with the most vivid memories of deportations in 1949 and the forced collectivisation, the foundation of kolkhozes;

the period from the late 1950s till 1980s – the years of stability and relative material welfare.

Finally, the contemporary period of Latvian history:

The reconstruction of the independence of Latvia, "… when the Soviet Union had crashed, the independent power returned". [DU MV 21]

The historical consciousness, in the oral history sources, is characterised by value judgements in relation to the above mentioned periods of history. These judgements have nothing in common with an objective analysis of the corresponding socio-political order. Their only criterion is the correspondence of the actual facts of the narrator's life in the past with a certain level of his or her scale of values, the possibilities of reaching personal goals, as well as meeting or ignoring, or even violating the narrator's interests. The respondent's social status and property, in a given period of time, are important factors as well. For example, the narrator who is a descendant of a family of Old Believers and who later became the head of a collective farm – a millionaire, relates his notion formed in childhood about private property (especially land) and the owner's status as essential values of human life. As his family had profited from these values to a full extent only once – in the 'times of Ulmanis', this period is especially highly valued:

> - Well, my father was hardly literate, he never went into politics, you see… the power for us always, well …
>
> - You must accept the power as it is…
>
> - Accept is one thing, another is that it seemed all right. Imagine, having 4 cows and 20 hectares [of land] – he lived decently – a landowner! [DU MV 214]

It is necessary to take into account the narrator's character traits as well, especially his or her inclination to be either optimistic or pessimistic, shaping the emotional background of memories and the evaluation of the respective historical period. For example, the narrator – a deeply religious Russian Orthodox woman, 82 years old, having experienced many a hardship, looking through 70 years old photographs exclaimed:

> "Here's our Ulmanis for whom I pray. And this is the [bishop] killed by the Soviets… Good Grief, Good Grief! How we lived in the times of Latvia!" [DU MV 5]

Depending on the specific life conditions of the narrator, the evaluations of the same period of time may not only differ, but may even reach opposite extremes. This is the reason why one encounters either memories filled with explicitly positive emotions (the first citation below) or exhaustive information about childhood and youth for which the respondent does not find vehement words and which is emotionally neutral (the second quotation).

> - So, tell us when was the best time of your life?
> - At present, the same as before war, in the times of Ulmanis. The time of Ulmanis was the best. Freedom… there was a ladies' bicycle, a cousin. On Sundays, we take the bicycle and off we go to a party outdoors, everybody was there. [DU MV 21]

> […] I was working as a farm-hand. Had to do everything about the farm-house. I was quite small then. I was a shepherd. Helped the mistress about the house. Such was the peasant's work. […] We were poor, hard-to-do. We owned nothing… [DU MV 45]

However, when going into a greater detail of certain situations, there is a common tendency of making a fair judgement, proceeding from the actual facts of a given period. Thus, concerning the closing of Russian schools during the Latvianisation campaign in the years of Ulmanis' rule, both above mentioned narrators provide a very similar, neutral evaluation of the fact, as painful as it may seem for them:

> - I did rather well at school; my parents were even respected by the teachers. In the last school year I took a repeated course, just because I went to Latvian school. Because already then, under that rule, I mean before war, it was like this: you come to a post-office (previously mail was not delivered in the village, you had to go to the post-office yourself) and you speak only Latvian.

- So, Latvian had become a must before the war …
- They did not demand it but started explaining – since you are pupils, you must learn. If you go and ask for a letter in Russian – they don't reply; then we ask in Latvian – and they reply. So it was! They replied to older people … [DU MV 21]

And this is the opinion of another narrator:

- I had studied at a Russian school till form 4, since the age of seven. I went to a Latvian school for 2 years; I was not good at Latvian. So I gave it up altogether, remained hardly literate.
- How were you treated at school? […]
- Relations were not bad. How was I treated? In Russian school it was good, and so it was in Latvian, too. You cannot take offence on the teachers. I gave up school because I was bad at learning in Latvian, that's why I gave it up. [DU MV 45]

The personal situation of the narrator is most essential for the evaluation of the subsequent periods as well. Many of them survived Nazi occupation rather successfully: "…they [Germans] were decent people. I wouldn't ever blame them, they did nothing bad to me […] they somehow did not trouble people" [DU MV 168]; "… we had nothing to eat, all burnt down, no bread, nothing. We were brought bread, sweets; something like two pots [by Germans]. […] They gave us food. So you can't say that the German was bad" [DU MV 217] – examples like these may be multiplied using the oral history sources [DU MV 17; 21; 43; 73]. However, some narrators [DU MV 45; 46] recall the Nazi occupation as the most horrible time of their life, because they were deported to Germany where they suffered much hardship, fear and humiliation.

The Stalinist period brought many people terrible suffering and anguish and they recall with open aversion anything that is related to that time, including the 'terrifying!' [DU MV 73] Soviet soldiers who entered Latvia in 1940. For others these soldiers in 1945 became the liberators from German captivity. One of the most dreadful experiences of the post-war period for Russians of Eastern Latvia, judging from memories, was deportation in March 1949. Even those respondents, who had not been deported, recall the March of 1949 as the time of premonition, terror and iniquity. The life stories of the deported people are strikingly dramatic.

A young mother, who was taken to the collecting point together with her husband, was forced to leave her 10 months old daughter with her neighbour, so that he would later pass her on to relatives, as the woman could not imagine if she would be able to feed the baby, keep her clean and

ultimately alive during the long journey to Siberia. Though the child was saved, and after a year taken by the grandmother, the mother could never get rid of the sense of guilt for having abandoned her daughter [DU MV 73]. In her turn, the daughter, who loved her mother and did not blame her for anything, learned from the stories of elders that in the day of deportation her legs became numb after the frightened mother had breast-fed her before leaving. Though the ailment was cured after some time, the woman still suffers from pain in her legs, the reason for which, according to her deep conviction, is the fright imbibed with the maternal milk [DU MV 72].

A middle-aged woman, who was a small girl in 1949, became witness of soldiers' arrival at their house on March 25 to take away her grandfather. As he was absent from home, having gone to Daugavpils to sell vegetables, the soldiers deported his wife – the narrator's grandmother. As the soldiers were leading her away, the children were running behind along the sodden spring-thaw ground and crying. When grandfather had returned and found out what had happened, he silently packed, asked for "a needle and thread – white and black…" and followed his wife. However, she was no longer at the collecting point. He followed her to Siberia, searched for several months, finally found her; they worked together on the collective farm in the Omsk region and afterwards returned to their homeland [DU MV 180]. The interviewer was shocked when another local resident stated that the reason why the respectful Old Believer had got on the list of deportees was the report of his son-in-law – the father of the above mentioned woman [DU MV 214]. It is not clear whether the granddaughter of the deported man knew about her father's role in the occasion. If so, this knowledge certainly aggravates her pain at remembering the past. However, the emotions, caused by the arrest of close relatives, were painful enough, and the suffering, offence, and fear persist up to the present.

The post-Stalin period is recalled in a more uniform way – with a comparative tolerance.

> - Was life better under the Soviets than it is now?
> - Well, certainly, already at Brezhnev's time… already, yes. Khrushchev was no good. But Brezhnev let us live. Brezhnev started paying on collective farms. There were wages, people were paid. […] Otherwise everybody worked for nothing, got no money. Small change. Small change was paid, to buy bread […] to eat. Lived on what one could steal. Just by stealing. [DU MV 217]

However, there are complaints about the anti-religious direction of Soviet ideology and politics, expressed by the majority [DU MV 5, 17; 20; 21; 72; 73] but ignored by some respondents [DU MV 45].

Nevertheless, differences in the evaluation of the past events are no obstacle for perceiving the similarity in the respondents' approach to the apprehension of the past. First, they are comparatively apolitical and do not tend to relate the past to the contemporary contradictions and claims against the existing power: "We never went into any politics and there is no reason why we should. We minded our own business, our job" [DU MV 17]; "We were certainly not engaged in politics … neither then nor now. Why? Because we had no time. We worked night and day." [DU MV 214] Second, with all the diversity of concrete situations, represented by the life stories of Russian people in Latgale of the generation, born in the 1920–30s (and younger), they reveal certain common value patterns affecting the self-identity of these people, including their relation to time – the past and the present:

> … I never joined the October children, neither was I a pioneer. Maybe because of my character: I was very boisterous; to become a pioneer, you had to be more dignified. And secondly, my grandfather used to say: "You are an Old Believer. How can you become an October child or a pioneer?" That was a kind of underground activity. Maybe, I was slightly restricted by this, but maybe pleased, yet I never took part in that kind of thing. [DU MV 20].

Among such values are the following: religious faith, respect for the elders, love and faithfulness, as well as respect for work, practical-mindedness, and high appreciation of the significance of material benefits allowing the human being to sustain self-respect and self-sufficiency in any historical circumstances. However, this is equally true about both Latvian and Russian respondents, as well as those of other nationalities.

There is only one peculiarity attracting attention when analysing the historical notions of the Russian people expressed in the oral history sources. Unlike Latvians, Poles, Jews and the representatives of other national minorities, who rather often, without much commentary, associate 'Russian' with 'Soviet', many respondents of Russian nationality feel a certain discomfort at this and have an urge of separating these two notions, as well as of locating themselves (as Russians, but not the 'Soviet' people) in relation to the opposition "Soviet" – "local":

> In 1940, when these cheeky Bolsheviks came […], when Russians arrived […], they immediately restored their own constitution and everything […] I am Russian and all, but I can't forgive them those deportations of people. They led so many people to destruction, you can't even tell! [DU MV 5]

Hence, it seems complicated to determine the intrinsically 'Russian' features in the historical notions reflected in oral history sources that would lead to an attempt at reconstructing the "Russian version" of Latvian 20th century history. The understanding of the essence of historical events by common people is hardly related to their ethnic origin. Individual peculiarities, social status, and political assumptions of the narrators are more influential as regards their apprehension and evaluation of history.

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How the Russians Turned into the Image of the "National Enemy" of the Estonians

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Historically, the Baltic Germans served as the image of the national enemy. In the 1940s and 1950s, as a result of Stalinist terror and Soviet policy, this did change. The paper explores the process of establishing a new image of a national enemy of Estonians: the Russians. Personal experience with terror and crime and the identification of 'Russian' with 'Soviet' triggered the development, as did in-migration and the fear of Russification. One aspect of the image of the national enemy is the idea of collective guilt and responsibility of ethnic groups.

Keywords: mentality, nationalism, Stalinism, Estonia

Introduction

The relationship between Estonians and Russians inside Estonia appears to be difficult. This is related to every-day and historical experience and also to the construction of the image of a "national enemy" among a certain number of Estonians. When using the expression "national enemy", I am not implying ethnic violence, hatred or open conflict. But in contemporary Estonian society one may find the image of a national enemy, the Russians. This image is not shared by everybody, but prejudice, stereotypes and antipathy are widespread phenomena. Being not a sociologist, but a historian, I will not present data, but refer to media, conversations or online commentaries. Especially in the discussion about entering the European Union and the NATO there occurred a lot of anti-Russian sentiment (e.g. Luik et al. 2003). Of course, after the regaining of independence in 1991, the inter-ethnic relations have improved constantly.

In developing a feeling of national consciousness, Estonians followed the Central European pattern of small nations, described by Miroslav

Hroch (1968). What was called later a "national awakening" happened in the last decades of the 19th century and was supported by the spread of education and mass media (Jansen 2003). In defining one's national identity the image of the "other" national or ethnic group was used to demonstrate to which group one did not belong. Very often, the image of the other was joined by the image of a "national enemy" in the process of nation building and defining ethnic identity. The case of France and Germany serves as a good example. Benedict Anderson and other scholars of nationalism speak about "invented communities", the construction of history and identity, and historical myths (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm, Ranger 1983; Hobsbawm 1990). The European nation state was a product of the 19th century and assisted by national historiography, tracing back the roots of modern nations to the middle-ages and even earlier.

When the Estonian national identity and Estonian nationalism emerged, the country had been ruled for several hundred years by small Baltic German elite, despite the fact that it had belonged, since Peter the Great, to the Russian Empire. German language and culture was omnipresent and for a long time rising in the social hierarchy meant becoming a "German". The society was obviously divided by language. When national aspirations awoke, the Baltic Germans turned into the "other". Estonians defined themselves as not being Germans. In addition, because the social status of Estonians and Baltic Germans was so different, ethnic and social conflict intermingled. The Germans were not only the "other", but they represented the image of the "national enemy", elaborated by Estonian journalists, writers, and the first historians.

For most Estonians, at the beginning of the 20th century, the history of the country was clearly divided. There was an idealized pre-historical period of freedom and independence, then came the German invaders with fire and sword in the 13th century and "700 years of oppression" started. The Baltic Germans, especially the barons, the owners of landed estates, were the "national enemy". They had enserfed the free Estonian peasant nation and took their land away. Officially, serfdom ended with a first agrarian reform at the beginning of the 19th century and after a second reform in the middle of the century a class of independent Estonian smallholders was formed. But Baltic Germans owned the majority of agricultural land until the land reform after the establishment of Estonian independence. The question this paper is addressing is how the Russians, instead of the Baltic-Germans, became the image of the "national enemy". In my opinion, this change happened mainly in the 1940s and 1950s during the time of Stalinist rule.

Beside literature and the archival sources of party and state, ego-documents will be used. There is a vast collection of life stories in the Estonian Literary Museum. Some contemporary diaries have been preserved. The author has conducted oral history interviews and used also those done by others. Other groups of sources are the answers to questionnaires send out regularly to the correspondents of the Estonian National Museum. These sources are not always quoted, but they provided me with the background to write this paper. They bear the "typical" problems of oral history. The sources possess a narrative structure, often changed by retelling the story several times. During Soviet rule, there was a fear to express oneself, only few diaries have thus survived. Memory is selective and we do not memorize everything "correctly". The memory was also formed and remodeled by the media, education, collective attitudes and today's opinion about the past.

Because of this, oral sources need a high degree of source criticism and they do not speak so much about "hard" facts, but about attitudes, mentality and understanding. But Soviet sources are also problematic (Graziosi 1999; Gestwa 2000). While even Moscow admitted a highly anti-Soviet and anti-Russian attitude in Estonia, many reports about the sentiment of the population draw a beautified picture. Despite the problem with sources, I still think it is possible explore the process of switching from one image of the enemy to another and to deal with the topic.

From Baltic Germans to Russians

In the time of national awakening, not only Estonians had a hostile attitude towards the Baltic Germans, but also Russian nationalism saw them as potential enemies. In a first stage, the interests of Estonian and Russian nationalism were nearly identical; both interpreted the Estonian peasants to be oppressed by the Germans, whose influence should be weakened in the future. In the 1880s, Russification started in the Baltic provinces of the Russian Empire (Thaden 1981). At that time, Estonian national consciousness had more or less already been developed. Russification was part of a unification and modernization process of the Empire. On one hand, it supported the use of Russian language in social life and made it compulsory in education and administration at the expense of German and Estonian. Thus, one might imagine that Estonian linguistic aspirations suffered. On the other hand, the Russification was mainly directed against the Baltic German elite, who stayed in power but lost influence. Some city councils were, for the first time in history, run by Estonians. Russification opened new opportunities for education and a career in the entire Empire.

Migration to the East occurred and it is estimated that roughly every fifth Estonian lived, before the outbreak of World War I, outside the country. St Petersburg became, after Tallinn, the second largest urban settlement of Estonians and turned into a "city of hope" (Pullat 2004). Since only few Russians lived inside Estonia, and they never formed a ruling class like the Baltic Germans did, there was obviously no real danger of losing national identity by being Russified. Germanization one generation earlier seemed to be a bigger problem.

So even during the Russification campaign, the Baltic Germans remained the main image of the enemy. In the revolution of 1905, Estonians and Latvians rebelled against the existing political order and demands for autonomy were also expressed, but the main actions were directed against Baltic German landlords. After the burning down of manor houses, punitive expeditions started. In the Duma, the Russian parliament, formed after the revolution, Estonian delegates cooperated with Russian parties. When World War I broke out, the majority of the Estonians were obviously still loyal subjects of the Tsar. There existed even some enthusiasm for the fight against a "historical enemy", the Germans (Raun 2001: 94).

During the war, the state distrusted the Baltic Germans, the public use of German was forbidden and their position weakened further. At that time, the Estonian elite dreamt of autonomy inside the Empire. After the February revolution in 1917, Estonians demonstrated on the streets of St Petersburg for national autonomy and this was granted by the Provisional Government. The Estonian territory, divided into the provinces of Estland and the northern part of Livland, was for the first time in history administratively united. Estonians benefited thus from an anti-German measure of the Provisional Government. The Imperial German army was already occupying parts of Latvia and, in the long run, an attack directed towards the Russian capital St Petersburg was feared.

After the October revolution, Estonia faced a short period of Bolshevik rule, later the country was occupied by Imperial German forces. Shortly before the Germans reached Tallinn, Estonian national circles declared independence. Lenin's policy and the advance of the troops of Wilhelm II, the German Emperor, led to the aspiration of an independent Estonian nation state. During the German occupation, many Baltic Germans were collaborating with them, dreaming of a Baltic satellite state of the German Empire under their rule. In the perspective of Estonians, they represented a much bigger danger than Russians.

After the collapse of Imperial Germany in November 1918, the Estonian war of independence broke out. It was fought against Soviet Russia, but

Russian, Estonian and Latvian units could be found on both sides of the front. Inside Estonia, there was sympathy for the Bolsheviks. It should not be forgotten that the Bolshevik party had cast 40.2 percent of the Estonian votes in the election for the Russian Constituent Assembly in November 1917 (Raun 2001: 103). Later, the war was not remembered as one of Estonians against Russians, but against the "Reds". In addition, during the turbulent year of 1919, German free corps together with some Baltic Germans staged a putsch in Latvia to establish a state dominated by Germans. The Estonian army crushed the German units, the Landeswehr, and the anniversary became later the holiday to commemorate the entire war.

Already during the war, the planning of a radical land reform to break up the estates was started and the legislation passed. This reform would establish a large amount of new farms, owned by Estonian peasants, and end the predominance of German land ownership. The reform was necessary, but it had an anti-German undertone. The compensation for the nationalized land was devalued by inflation and the "barons" lost a large amount of their property.

The Republic of Estonia was among the successor states of the Tsarist Empire, just like Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Finland. The official language changed, but there was even more continuity with the pre-war times in the social, economical and political sphere than in Russia proper, where the civil war and the Bolsheviks turned everything upside down. The Estonian national elite had been educated in Russian schools and universities and among them were many who had been repatriated from Russia (Medijainen 2005: 207). Many members of the elite held a positive attitude towards Russian language and culture, despising at the same time the Soviet regime. At the beginning of independence, there were hopes of entering the huge Russian market and Estonia functioned as a transit corridor for Soviet trade (Valge 2003). Not everybody thought that the newly established state would have a future.

During Estonian independence, a cultural autonomy for minorities was established and the Baltic Germans remained over-represented among the elite. For the majority of the Estonians they stayed the "national enemy". Meanwhile the attitude towards the Russian minority was more or less neutral or they were regarded with a feeling of superiority. The local Russians, mainly peasants and workers, were poorer and less educated than Estonians. The small Russian elite, often "white emigrants" were respected or even feared, because of the danger of the restoration of the Russian Empire. But generally speaking, there existed prejudice against Germans and Jews, but a neutral attitude towards Russians (Hovi 2003: 214–216).

The rise of Hitler and of a national-socialist movement among the Baltic Germans complicated inter-ethnic relations. A survey conducted by the State Propaganda Administration and the governing party, the Fatherland Union, from April 1939 in an atmosphere of international tension dealt with the attitude of the population. Germany was seen as the bigger danger in nine of eleven of the counties (Ant 1999: 33–35). Kalev writes in his life story: "Among the population there was an understanding that it is better to support the arrival of the Russians than the arrival of the Germans, because it was thought, one could get rid of the Russians more easily." (KM-EKLA 350–998: 22)

According to the secret protocol of the German-Soviet pact of Non-aggression from August 1939, Estonia fell into the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. As a result, Soviet troops were stationed in Estonia after Moscow had given Estonia an ultimatum. The Baltic Germans started to resettle in Germany (see Loeber 1972). In later memory, the Baltic Germans recalled that Estonians were sad and sensed what might happen to them in the future. Some Estonians remembered in a similar way, but contemporary newspapers spoke another language. In fact, Estonians were happy that the Baltic Germans left their country and they did not sense the Soviet danger (Kivimäe 1995). But with the end of the physical presence of Germans in the country, it was hard to keep the image of the enemy alive.

At the beginning, the Soviet soldiers behaved more or less correctly. The military bases reduced local unemployment and were thus even somehow welcomed. The soldiers appeared to be backward, poor and less educated, supporting the prejudice held by Estonians. An Estonian teacher, interviewed by a political officer of the Red Army in September 1944, stated for example: "You do not know how the Estonians smiled when the Russians arrived [in 1939]. They were so poorly dressed. Even our industrial workers laughed about them. And the Russians began to take everything. And life turned worse. Of course the Estonian communists lived well, but our nation suffered desperately. And everybody was angry about the Russians." (ERAF 1-1-885)

During the so-called winter war, Stalin attacked Finland also from his Estonian military bases, but Estonians remained happy to be kept out of the great war in Europe and the government did not protest, even when Stalin let Finland be bombed from his Estonian bases. According to the Soviet-Estonian treaty, the Soviets would not interfere into Estonian internal affairs. In the June of 1940, in the shadow of Hitler's victory in France, the situation changed. Estonia faced another Soviet ultimatum, additional troops were based and a new pro-Soviet puppet government

was installed. In August, the country was incorporated into the USSR. According to memories, people were depressed, but no open resistance was demonstrated when losing independence. The reports on the sentiments of the population spoke, until June of 1941, mainly about discontent with the economic situation (ERAF 1-1-46 – 59). In fact, an economic decline, thanks to Soviet restructuring and a land reform, led to over-all deficits, a decrease of the real incomes by roughly the half and an increase of the crude death rate by one half (Mertelsmann 2005). The Estonian abbreviation, for the Estonian Socialist Soviet Republic, ENSV, was now called "*Enne nälg, siis viletsus*", "First hunger then misery", documented for the first time in November 1940 (ERAF 1-1-57: 18). The first crimes of Red Army soldiers were reported, for example, the rape of a school pupil (ERAF 1-1-77: 14), but the beginning of political arrests was not noted by everybody. This changed with the shock of a mass deportation in June of 1941. When Germany attacked the USSR, Soviet destroyer battalions spread terror in the countryside and the security organs killed prisoners brutally.

One year of Soviet rule was enough to change the attitude of the population. Of course, this swing did not happen over night and the image of the enemy was established during decades. As a result of Soviet terror, only two years after Estonians had been happy to get rid of the Baltic Germans, Hitler's troops were greeted as liberators (Laar 2005: 7). The citizens of Estonia, except for Gypsies and Jews, were officially treated equally by the Germans, ethnic Russians received, for example, the same rations as did Estonians. As an exception in Eastern Europe, German rule was comparatively "liberal" and less oppressive than Stalinism. Estonians saw now the main danger coming from the East, as was articulated in an announcement for the mobilization into Estonian Self-Defence (Postimees 1941). In the first weeks of the German occupation, revenge was taken. Communists, Soviet activists and sympathizers, or those judged to belong to these categories, were arrested and often killed, not only by the Germans, but also by Estonian units (Birn 2001). Russians were over-represented among the victims of the German occupation (Paavle 2002: 18).

The experience of those citizens, being mobilized into the Red Army or evacuated to the Soviet hinterland, was that Russia was poor and underdeveloped. Later, these people should play an important role in post-war reconstruction and the continuation of the Sovietization process in Estonia.

The fact that Soviet rule was interpreted as Russian rule, and even ethnic Russians used this expression, led to an attitude identifying

Russians entirely with all the problems Stalinism created. In Estonian parlance, the period of Soviet rule is called the Russian time (*vene aeg*), the German occupation the German time (*saksa aeg*) and the period of independence the Estonian time (*eesti aeg*). To the question, how would you define Sovietization, posed in questionnaire no. 215 of the Estonian National Museum, dealing with social change during Soviet rule, many respondents answered simply that this is Russification. Of course, a few of Estonia's Russians welcomed the Soviet troops in 1939 and the annexation of Estonia in 1940 (Boikov, Isakov & Rajasalu 2001: 75).

Before Heinrich, born 1915, writes about the fact that the Germans have killed 14 persons in his region he compares German and Soviet soldiers in the summer of 1941: "We feared the Russians and had not learnt yet to fear the Germans. They are coming in a friendly mood and it is possible to talk with them. The soldiers of the other side hold their weapons the entire time in their hands and look at you like at a mad dog. They do not risk talking with you, maybe the politruk [political officer in the Red Army] sees it. The German puts the weapon away, opens his cloth to take a sun bath and starts to play the harmonica." (KM-EKLA 350-145: 16)

In the first period of German occupation, only volunteers from Estonia entered German units. A male, born in 1924, comments: "I believe, it did not happen often in history that people so enthusiastically volunteered to fight in a war and on the side of their enemies – the Germans. But hating the Communists was stronger …" (KM-EKLA 350-143). Ethnic Russians served also in Estonian units of the Waffen-SS or in the police battalions. Two times more Estonian citizens served in a German uniform than in a Soviet one. The Third Reich was seen as a lesser evil, even when Estonia was not granted any sort of autonomy and remained occupied.

Meanwhile, many Soviet prisoners of war survived, because they worked on Estonian farms. The national enemy must not be a personal one; this forms an important part of the image of the enemy. It is a group, but relations to a single member might be established without great friction. When after the war these farmers were accused of being collaborators with the Germans or kulaks, some former prisoners of war wrote even letters of support for them (Kõll 2003: 145).

Before the Red Army recaptured Estonia in September 1944, a mass flight to the West occurred. In Estonia, there were some hopes of a change of the Stalinist regime. Estonian units also fought in the Red Army. "Now we have a new order. We are and we live in a new state. The first impression is not bad. The Russians behave correctly. There are no signs of turmoil or of a decline of order. The Germans plundered more", wrote

Jaan Roos on 22 September 1944 in his diary (Roos 1997: 86). The diary of Jaan Roos, who hid himself later for nine years to avoid arrest, is an excellent source for the mentality prevailing in those years. Three days later he noted: "The Russian does not kill; he does not deport or rape women. A number of Russian officers said we will free the country from the Germans and then leave. Your country will be left to you to govern it." (Roos 1997: 89)

The hopes were quickly disappointed. Red Army soldiers behaved like on enemy territory, they stole, raped, plundered and murdered. According to a report of the Soviet Estonian people's commissariat of the interior, the majority of registered crimes in the last three months of 1944 were committed by Red Army soldiers (ERAF 1-3-435: 1). A party report from October 1944 stated also that after the end of fighting Red Army soldiers were robbing and stealing on a large scale (ERAF 1-1-819f: 1).

"They [the Russians] behave very rudely and they are stealing and plundering without keeping any limits. […] The Russians have gone beyond any limits. But the Germans have not been much better", noted Jaan Roos on 12 October 1944 (Roos 1997: 103). A thirteen year old girl wrote, in February 1945, in her diary: "I still remember the Republic of Estonia and dislike Communism; it brought us death and destruction. Maybe Communism is very good and justified, but in the hands of those men … it is filled with killings and robberies." (KM-EKLA 350-1094: 5). In September 1945, the party secretary of Viru County wrote to the first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party about the behaviour of an army unit in his district: "[…] all the time soldiers, sergeants and even officers take part in plundering, clashes, robbing from the peasants, raping women and hooliganism." (ERAF 1-3-436: 78). A wave of political mass arrests started, reached the highest point ever, and disrupted the population (on the scale of the arrests see Õispuu 1998: D5).

According to a report written by the political commander of the Third Baltic Front, about the situation in Estonia and Latvia in September 1944, the Soviet soldiers asked themselves several questions: Why are they not welcomed by the population? Why is the attitude of Estonians and Latvians so negative towards the Red Army? Why there is so little destruction visible? Where do they find poverty and workers? Does the local population consist only of kulaks and exploiters? Where are the males, did they flee with the Germans? Because of this the soldiers behaved often like on foreign and not on Soviet territory he concluded (ERAF 1-1-885).

This report helps in fact to understand the attitude of Soviet soldiers. Compared to Russian territory occupied by the Germans, destruction was really small. People did not greet the Red Army as liberator, because they feared the Soviets more than the Germans. Because of the higher standard of living even during wartime, Estonians did not look so exhausted and poor like the normal Soviet citizens. Being exposed for a long time to Communist propaganda, the normal soldier really thought that the Estonians were "bourgeois" and rich; this meant they were class enemies. The lack of males was clearly related to German and Soviet mobilizations. Having fought sometimes for months against Estonian units in German uniforms, the conclusion for many Soviet soldiers seemed to be clear: Estonians were fascists and belonged to an enemy nation. Their behaviour was according to this idea.

In 1946–47, refugees from starving areas in Russia, the so-called bag people appeared in the Baltic republics. Now they committed a large number of crimes. A report from the ministry of the interior of the ESSR stated, for example, that two-thirds of criminal offenders from March to May 1947 were Russians, Belorussians or Ukrainians and most of the criminals were coming from outside the republic (ERAF 1-5-36: 64). The widespread appearance of beggars, refugees from starving regions and the impact of criminality must have influenced the attitude of many Estonians towards Russians.

Anna, an Estonian born in Russia 1922 and married to a Russian, remembered: "Even when our family was half-Russian, my husband said what the Russians brought to Estonia was theft, drinking, and swearing." (ERM-KV 988: 297). Urve, born in 1931, described: "The image from the Soviet time is the following, on the street or from behind a window or a door there is coming a Russian soldier with an automatic gun. Everywhere on the island of Saaremaa you could meet them. Sometimes you heard that they killed or raped, robbed or stole somewhere. The entire time you have to be careful not to say anything against the order of the state." (ERM-KV 983: 64). In an anonymous letter from October 1945 to Nikolai Karotamm, the first party secretary, the author made clear who he saw responsible for poverty, misery and suppression: Communist and Russian "parasites". (ERAF 1-3-481: 200–201).

The *svodki* are another source dealing with public sentiment. They were secretly compiled by the security organs and party instructors to keep the upper echelons of the party informed about the sentiment of the population. Some questions asked at public meetings after the war are striking:

- "How many five year plans are necessary that Estonians look so hungry and wornout like the Russians?"
- "Why are the Russians robbing and stealing so much?" (ERA R-1-5-154: 153)
- "Why there is no action taken against the hooliganism and banditry of the soldiers?" (ERAF 1-1/4-243: 11)
- "Why has the discipline fallen in some army units and the soldiers are raping girls and are stealing bicycles?" (ERAF 1-3-115: 26)
- "Please answer the question, why are the Russians killing people and are stealing? What is this, the culture of the Soviet Union?" (ERAF 1-1/4-276: 36)
- "Will the Russians leave the country after the end of war?" (ERAF 1-3-115: 2)
- "When will the Russian units leave the country and only our troops will stay?" (ERAF 1-1/4-276: 32)

Since those questions were posed by the population at public meetings – of course some in a written and anonymous way –, there must have been reasons to demonstrate such an attitude.

Paul Winterton, working for the BBC in Moscow during and after the war, wrote about his impression of Tallinn after the "liberation": "I discovered that the bulk of the people of Tallinn were extremely hostile to the Soviet Union, had no desire to be part of it, feared that the Russians would deport large numbers of them into the interior of Russia as was done in 1940, and had been if anything rather relieved by the German occupation. I tried to write a part of this, but of course the censor stopped it all – even though I put the whole thing in an objective setting and emphasized the strategic importance of the Baltic States to Russia's security." (Miner 2003: 290)

The post-war years saw the biggest in-migration in Estonian history; roughly 20,000 Russian speakers per year migrated to Estonia (Tammaru 1999: 15) and raised fears of Russification. In 1949, a mass deportation prepared the forced collectivization of agriculture, which ended independent farming and led to a decline of the standard of living of the rural population (ERAF 1-114-57: 38). The security organs and the party were manned with Russian speakers, who formed a majority (e. g. Kommunisticheskaya 1983: 108–109). Those factors supported the image of the enemy. Old stereotypes found an equivalent in everyday experience and new stereotypes were generated. A number of Russians appeared to be criminal, uneducated, poor, filthy and lazy. Again, the image was dealing with a group and not with single individuals. Ilme, born in 1932, wrote in 1953 in her diary while spending time in a sanatorium: "Ivanov is an

interesting man here. Maybe not all Russians are 'murderers'. There are others, too. He is honest, straight and polite" (ERM-EKLA 350-1094: 25). Even Moscow realizes a very strong anti-Russian attitude in the Baltic republics, which was the reason for many Russians to leave the country (Zubkova 2001: 92).

A song from the 1940s sums up some stereotypes:

Olen vaene Venemaa kolhoosnik,
täiu täis ja ilma püksata.
Võtaks naise, et saaks kohvipiima,
lehma ei viitsi pidada.

I'm a poor Russian kolkhoznik,
lice-ridden and without trousers.
Should take a wife to get coffee cream,
'cause don't care to keep a cow.
(After the melody of Katyusha.)

An anonymous letter to Nikolai Karotamm, first party secretary, from January 1950 offers the opportunity to imagine what many people thought at that time: "Lenin's teachings, which are rotten and sick have already led the former rich Russia and states raped by her into incredible poverty, misery, founded camps for slave labor, where 20,000,000 (read 20 million) innocent people suffer. Research this. Go into the homes of the workers and into the factories and compare, go into the slave camps (the kolkhozes) and compare this life with the pre-war period. Go at least to the Estonian-Russian border and look at the wonderful human creatures coming from Russia – the representatives of a social world and think, are those starved, poor creatures happy and enjoy the new order? The intellectual state of the Russians is mirrored in their misery. […] And the culture! This Asian culture makes Aryan cultured nations suffer and they have to thank the "Great" leader for it. Of course, this is uncomfortable for them and the bad feeling hurts their hearts. Everything is now stolen and destroyed. Only ruins remain and a herd of starving naked human beings […] But in some years (maybe even earlier) this Communist snakes' nest will be destroyed. Then it will take decades, when everything will be reconstructed, and at least Russia reaches again the level of development of the Tsarist period." (ERAF 1-46-84: 10-11)

Elena Zubkova comes to the conclusion that the anti-Russian attitude in Estonia was fostered by the experience of the first Soviet year, the stationing of Soviet troops, the migration, the promotion of ethnic

Russians, people who were fleeing from starvation and drunken soldiers. "This created the opinion that Russians are uneducated and uncultured, people who have no clean hands." (Zubkova 2000: 203)

Some migrants had their own patterns of prejudice or developed them after facing the cold attitude of Estonians. Estonians were called fascists, *nemtsy* (Germans) or *tshudy* (a prerogative of Finno-Ugrians). The Great Russian propaganda, called "National Bolshevism" by David Brandenberger (2002), added further problems. The Russian nation was interpreted to be the bigger brother of all nations of the USSR. The pressure on Estonian culture, the forced learning of Russian at school and the migration raised fears of losing the national identity. And, many thought that maybe all Estonians would be collectively deported. When the situation in the 1950s normalized many Russians left the country again, but in-migration remained a reality of every-day life. Ethnic tension sometimes ending in fights, which occurred in places like Narva, as Arvi, born 1934, remembered (KM-EKLA 350-1: 29). Librarian Urve, born 1929, writes: "Directly after the war, there was a negative attitude towards everything Russian. This was the feeling of the majority of school pupil and influenced them. Studying at university this changed especially among those, who did their practical work in Russia" (ERM-KV 987: 378–379). When characterizing the Soviet period, Juhan, born 1921, notes: "Other nations were avoided, especially the Russians" (ERM-KV 985: 244). "The best Russian is a dead Russian", writes Leo, born 1926, in his life story (KM-EKLA 350-858).

Conclusion

Russians became, instead of Baltic Germans, the image of the "national enemy" of Estonians. Under the circumstances of a cultural Russification, it was highly important to distinguish ones-self from Russians. Concrete historical events and personal experience like terror, crime, violence and poverty triggered this image. Mass migration and historical myths were additional factors. Since Soviet was perceived as identical to Russian, the meaning of both words intermingled. There existed a clear-cut image that Estonians were victims and Russians perpetrators. To a certain extent, Estonians were ignorant of the fact that Russians also suffered from the same Stalinist dictatorship. Behind those images of an enemy we find ideas of collective guilt and collective responsibility of ethnic groups.

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The Strategies of Identity Re-construction in Post-Soviet Estonia

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Based on the concept of cultural trauma by Sztompka, the paper analyses how people place in their mind, the narratives and categories accompanied by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rapid rise of national ideology and the extension of the Estonian geo-cultural space.
The dominating identity among the Estonians is the national identity in which civic, ethnic as well as territorial dimensions are represented. Among the Estonian Russians, the dominating collective identity is territorial-ethnic.
The geo-cultural opening of Estonia is reflected in the identification of the Estonians more clearly than in the identification of the Estonian Russians. Identity categories related to the Soviet Union have not entirely disappeared from the imaginary repertoire if self-identification.
The analysis on the survey results reveal that dramatic imagination of changes in collective "self", is more widespread among Estonian Russians who have a relatively good social position and hold positive attitude towards social changes. People, who have difficulties in adapting to the changes and a less secure position in society, tend to avoid interpreting their past.

Keywords: Estonian Russians, post-Soviet transformation, collective identity, self-categorisation, cultural trauma

Theoretical framework of the study – the cultural trauma

Changes in the culture of a transitional society can be studied on the basis of changes in the structure of society and in public texts (including artefacts), as well as through interpretation and "processing" of an individual. Collective identity – understood in the context of this paper as a feeling of attachment, or allegiance in relation to certain groups – is one

of the most important "processing" of cultural changes at the level of an individual. In the words of Hall: 'identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned and position ourselves within the narratives of the past' (Hall 1990). The paper is based on the premise, that in times of transformation, collective identities become mass vehicles for a popular understanding of events – ideologies and symbols "circulating" in the public sphere will be embedded in identities (i.e. Danilova & Yadov 1997; Castells 1997). Therefore, the question of how the transition is echoed, in the collective identities in post-Soviet countries, is an interesting quasi-experimental research object.

The quick economic, political and cultural transition, and opening up of the geo-cultural space of Estonia, can be interpreted as a sudden radical comprehensive social change, reflected also in the domain of culture. The re-structuring of the political, economic and social spheres and changes in social relationships in the late 1980s and early 1990s destroyed, in Estonia, many previous sources of collective identification and created a situation, which several post-Soviet theoreticians have called a social trauma (Caruth 1995; Roth 1995; Neal 1998) Thus, the concept of social trauma and especially the concept of cultural trauma (Sztopmka 2000; 2004) have been selected for the theoretical framework for interpretation in this study.

In the concept of cultural trauma, culture appears to be a context of change in the sense of a "socially shared pool of ready-made templates engaged by agents in labelling, defining, and interpreting certain events (—) framing, and narrating the ongoing social praxis" and an "object of change affected by agential praxis and major social upheavals" (Sztopmka 2000: 450–451). Sztompka proceeds from the concept of two cultures: the old cultural perceptions (rules, values, meanings, symbols, discourses) and the emerging culture adequate for the new social conditions. When the changes in the political and socio-economic sphere are prompt, certain inertia exists in the cultural environment, which enables the earlier, obsolete culture to coexist with the new culture, thus bringing about tension between the 'two cultures' and providing the condition of cultural split or ambivalence and a fertile climate for cultural trauma 'a culturally defined wound in the very same culture' (Sztompka 2000: 463). It seems that Kennedy uses the term transition culture in order to mark the ambivalent cultural environment, where the earlier, obsolete, culture coexists with the new culture (Kennedy 2002).

Based on Sztompka, we can distinguish between the 'old' Soviet cultural flow and the 'new' global, modern cultural flow coming from the West, as a basis for cultural trauma in Estonia[1] . Estonia has moved rapidly into global communication networks and open media spheres, after being quite isolated from outside influences during the Soviet era. Usage of various forms of (global) electronic entertainment, spending a great deal of time watching TV and surfing the Internet, is likely to shape, to a great extent, the cultural-communicative practices and perceptions of the Estonians and Estonian Russians, especially the younger generation. The advance of English-based mass culture has spread explosively, rather than step by step in Estonia since the re-establishing of independence.

Social change does produce disruption of the life-world, bringing about several potentially traumatising events or situations. People use the available pool of cultural resources to interpret those events or situations. The analysis is based on the premise that collective identities represent popular understanding of events (Danilova & Yadov 1997) – ideologies and symbols "circulating" in the public sphere will be embedded in identities (Castells 1997). Therefore, collective identi-fication of people (where I belong / don't belong) is a good object of an analysis of transition society and culture.

Authors have described several new cultural 'templates' and narratives established either by the elite (Feldman 2000) or at the grass-roots level (Kennedy 2002), which could be the signs of a new culture emerging as a result of cultural trauma in post-Soviet Estonia. Thus, inhabitants of Estonia are faced with rather wide repertoire of available cultural templates – identifying categories, symbols and narratives – of old and new society, to deal with the changes. According to Sztompka,

[1] At the same time we cannot draw an exact line between the 'old' Soviet culture and the 'new' (global, post-modern) culture. In a virtual way, Western (mass) culture existed also in the Soviet era as a metaphor signifying freedom of self-expression and the freedom of choice that had been yearned for so long. During the Soviet era, Westernism existed on the level of an abstract idea rather than on the level of concrete personal symbols and references. According to some authors, the Russian-speaking settlers evaluated the local lifestyle more highly (Melvin 1995). Russian intelligentsia considered the Baltic countries to be 'a little West'. For the Estonians, Westernism has been, for a long period, something very desirable as a form of confrontation with the Soviet era. Therefore in Estonia people's desire to get rid of Soviet references and the wish to be "like the West" was rather significant.

strategies and cultural templates utilised in order to overcome the causes of trauma, accompanied by generation turnover, could lead to the strengthening of a new, emerging culture in a particular society (Sztompka 2000). The objective of the following analysis is to explore how people use the identification categories, which are associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union, rapid emerging of national ideology and extension of the Estonian geo-political space, to explain the change in their social status and group belonging. Are social changes perceived as traumatic from the perspective of identification (i.e. the co-existence of the new and old culture is creating tension), or are they formed, at an individual level, as a single comprehensive narrative?

The first part of the analysis is focused on identification categories, such as "socially shared pool of ready-made templates engaged by agents" (Sztopmka 2000: 450). By describing the frequencies and socio-demographic peculiarities, of the usage of categories, we describe the context of changes.

The second part of the analysis is dedicated to general strategies of self-categorisation of individuals. Determining the relation between the past and the present, placement of categories in one's memory are analysed as an "object of change affected by agential praxis" (Sztopmka 2000: 450).

Based on this theoretical framework, the following analytic tasks are posed for empirical analysis:

The legitimacy of which identification categories has changed most in the cognition of the Estonian population, which categories are perceived as fading away from the cultural space of transitional Estonia and which ones are emerging?

Which categories are central to the transition period, i.e. are perceived as stable, creating a meaning both in the past and in the present and might thus become a basis for new identities?

Which are the general strategies of determining relation between the past and the present self-identification? Is the past contrasted with the present, or is the interpretation of the past avoided in retrospective self-identification?

Methodological considerations

It is generally argued that the process of identification involves the publicly offered *external* definition, called *social categorisation*, and the *internal* process or the (partial) acquisition or rejection of identities, called *internalisation* (Jenkins 1996; 2000). Thus, one possibility of

exploring identity is via self-categorisation, which has fed several empirical studies of political and cultural identity of minority groups and is also utilised in our study.[2]

There are diverse groups and communities, but this dynamism and multilayered nature of social relations may give rise to the need for certain hierarchies – emergence of dominant and peripheral solidarities (Danilova & Yadov 1997). Some groups and communities dominate and are 'cross-situational', while others are peripheral. Constructions, in group solidarities, vary in their degree of rigidity. Thus, I do assume that the categories more frequently selected are more rigid and, vice versa, the identification categories that carry symbols, which are not strong enough, are not internalised. I assume that when people start to give a meaning to what has happened to their group solidarities, society is no longer as turbulent and the process of 'crystallisation' of certain identity patterns and trajectories has begun.

Internalisation of various identification categories was utilised in the empirical research. Some of the identification categories were first analysed in the course of prior qualitative in-depth interviews (Masso 1999). The willingness of individuals to use a specific category for self-designation today, and 15 years ago, was measured in the questionnaire.

Two questions were asked of the respondents:

1. There are various ways of answering the question 'Who you are?' With which groups do you identity yourself? Respondents had to indicate if they felt themselves to be a part of a particular category *"certainly", "at times, partly" or "not at all".*

2. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the regaining of independence, the Republic of Estonia has witnessed many societal changes. Please try to recall how you used to feel, and describe yourself

[2] I do not assume that the retrospective categories echo the situation prior to transformation process. Neither do I assume that this method covers fully the identity topic. The study of identifying categories is only one way to address the problem that can at best 'scratch the surface'. The findings are interpreted by keeping in mind that the respondents might share the category but do not necessarily its meaning. However, we assume that a general overview of the reception of the most commonly used categories will bring out the most general lines for further ethnographic and other type of research on the identity development. The self-categorization concept is discussed by Abrams & Hogg 1990; Hopkins & Reicher 1996; Brady 2000; Haslam *et al.* 2000, etc.

15 years ago, at the time of the Estonian SSR? Respondents had to indicate if they felt a member of a particular category "*certainly", "at times, partly" or "not at all"* Also the variable *"don't know, don't remember"* was available.

The following categories were presented to respondents: *Estonian/Russian, Estonian-speaking/ Russian- speaking person, inhabitant of (previous) Estonian SSR, citizen of the Republic of Estonia, inhabitant of Estonia, Baltic inhabitant, Soviet person, northerner, European, world citizen.*

The question about self-designation 15 years ago was not asked of respondents who were under 30. Thus the analysis, including past self-designations and strategies of combining the self-identification in the past with present-day self-identification, is done on the sub-sample of persons aged 30–74.

This sub-sample is supposed to express the tension between two cultures, most vividly. Their active socialisation period falls partly in the Soviet era, being of the age of 15 years or older by the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Data source

Empirical analysis, based on the representative survey "Me, the Media and the World", was carried out by the Department of Journalism and Communication of the University of Tartu in co-operation with the research company Faktum during December 2002 and January 2003. The survey covered the use of media, interests, values and identity, attitudes towards the changes in Estonia during the past 10–15 years, life-style and life conditions. The sample was composed of 15–74 year-old inhabitants, according to a territorially representative population model of Estonia. The total sample size 1,470 persons, with 940 answering in Estonian and 509 in Russian. The question about self-designation 15 years ago was not asked of respondents who were under 30. Thus 1,025 respondents, from them 358 Russian-speaking persons and 667 ethnic Estonians answered the question about retrospective self-designation. As background variables, I used ethnicity, age, education, income and attitude towards changes with various social groupings.

Results

The results of an empirical analysis are presented in two parts. The first part deals with the frequency of the acceptance and rejection of identification categories in sub-samples of the Estonians and the Estonian Russians.

In the second part, I will analyse general strategies of answering questions (selecting categories) rather than nominal categories.

I Self-categorisation of Estonians and Estonian Russians today and in Soviet times.

1.1. Imagined identity structure prior transformation

In this sub-section I will discuss the answers to the question about retrospective self-designations 15 years ago, thus prior to dissolution of the Soviet Union and the transformation. We do not assume that the respondents really felt so 15 years ago. Rather, I intend to measure how people see (interpret) the development paths of their self-identification. The results are shown in Table 1.

All respondents who were asked this question, i.e. respondents aged 30 to 74, form the total sample here.

Table 1. Retrospective internalisation and rejection of identification categories among Estonians (N=680) and Estonian Russians (N=358) aged 30 to 74.

I felt 15 years ago, that I was...		certainly	sometimes, partly	not at all	don't remember	no answer
...an inhabitant of the Estonian SSR	*Estonians*	64	17	8	5	7
	Estonian Russians	78	7	4	3	6
...an Estonian / a Russian	*Estonians*	88	4	2	2	5
	Estonian Russians	76	10	6	3	5
....a Soviet person	*Estonians*	32	23	34	5	7
	Estonian Russians	73	8	5	5	8
...an inhabitant of Estonia	*Estonians*	77	10	3	3	7
	Estonian Russians	61	11	9	8	11
...a Russian / an Estonian language speaker	*Estonians*	67	12	8	6	7
	Estonian Russians	58	12	16	6	9
...a Baltic inhabitant	*Estonians*	45	31	11	5	8
	Estonian Russians	53	18	9	9	10
...a citizen of the Republic of Estonia	*Estonians*	19	13	49	10	9
	Estonian Russians	14	5	51	16	14
....a European	*Estonians*	16	24	42	11	7
	Estonian Russians	13	14	46	15	13
....a world citizen	*Estonians*	12	16	52	13	7
	Estonian Russians	13	11	47	17	12
...a northerner	*Estonians*	16	29	36	11	8
	Estonian Russians	11	16	46	15	12

Source: Survey "Me, the Media and the World", December 2002 – January 2003, Dept. of Journalism and Communication, University of Tartu.

We can see that the structures of the answers given by Estonians and Russians (the shares of identifying and approving/rejecting categories), do not differ from each other significantly. Based on the shares of internalising, rejecting or avoiding (do not know, no answer) answers, we will first look at the retrospective self-identifying strategies of Estonian Russians and then at those of Estonians.

Among the options available for retrospective self-determination, most of the Estonian Russians selected the Soviet identification categories – either *Soviet person* or *inhabitant of Estonian SSR*. The category of Soviet person was one of the prevailing self-designations among Estonian Russians in the Soviet times (Haav, quoted in Jakobson 2002) and the category has maintained its importance in retrospective self-designations. Most authors agree that during the Soviet times ethnic background wasn't the main basis for self-definition (Brubaker 1996). Media analysis indicates that the main markers of identity during Soviet times were politics and ideology; these created a sense of civil and political unity with the state and prescribed, for citizens, certain rules and qualities (Jakobson 2002). The retrospective in-depth interviews, conducted with Estonian Russian-speakers reveal that such attributes as extra-territorial status, the Russian language, and a similar way of life had strong security connotations in the Soviet identification category (Masso 2002). Besides Soviet affiliation, the respondents also remarked significantly often the feeling of affiliation with Estonian Soviet society (Table 2). In addition to the Soviet identity, the local Russian-language press constructed a civic identity with the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and an Estonian identity as the identity of an ethnographic group (Jakobson 2002).

We can see the high response rates for the categories *Russian* and *Russian language speaker*. This corresponds to the findings of Yadov, Kosmarskaya and other Russian scholars who have reported a rise in ethnic solidarities (see above). Some analysts also stated in the mid-90s that the Russophone population could turn to 'Russianness' (Chinn & Kaiser 1996). The reasons for the rise in (retrospective) ethnic self-identification may also lie partly in the nature of Soviet identity. Authors have argued that the Soviet identity was a 'surrogate' of state-led political and ethnic identity (Kosmarskaya 2003). Castells argues that Soviet identity was constructed around a double identity. On the one hand, composed of ethnic/national identities (including Russian), and on the other hand, establishing a Soviet identity as the foundation of a new society: the Soviet people would be the new cultural identity to

be achieved in the historical horizon of Communist construction (Castells 1997).

The relatively frequent internalisaton of the category *Baltic inhabitant* likely corresponds to the fact that the three Baltic states were called *Pribaltika*. Also, some authors spoke of *balticisation* already in the Soviet times (Melvin 1995). Melvin describes this nomination as adaptation to regional behaviour, manners, values etc. Melvin and Kolstø both argue that settlers from other republics adopted the local identity – they "balticised". However, the category of *Baltic inhabitant* was not constructed in the media during Soviet times (Jakobson 2002). Thus, this identification category is instead developed on the grass-roots level.

Besides civic, cultural and pan-Baltic affiliation, there was a relatively significant proportion of Estonian Russians who still identified themselves during Soviet times as *inhabitants of Estonia* – 42% of respondents indicated retrospectively being 15 years ago certainly 'a part of this group'. Kolstø has found similar results in his comparative study, stating that Estonian Russians do identify themselves more with Estonia as an independent state (Kolstø 2000). On the other hand, the formally more narrow category *citizen of the Republic of Estonia* was chosen by 10 per cent of respondents.

There is quite a clear boundary between the dominant and peripheral identifying categories. The so-called global categories such as *northerner, European and world citizen* were not chosen very frequently.

When we compare the (retrospective) choices made between different identification categories of Estonian Russians to the relevant choices of Estonians, the most distinguishable difference lays in the rejection/acceptance of the category *Soviet citizen*. While three quarters of Estonian Russians accept this category retrospectively then only every third Estonian internalises the category. One third of respondents reject this category resolutely ("definitely not").

Thus, in the collective memory of Estonians the category of *"Soviet citizen"* is rejected and the category *"an inhabitant of the Estonian SSR"* legitimised. The connotations of the latter category are more positive probably not only because of the definition of a specific location but also because of historical connotations – Estonia was an economically successful Soviet republic where progressive economic models were tested (a nutrition programme, experimental collective farms, etc.). It is likely that the nostalgia for Estonia as "a small and efficient" Soviet republic and the image of Estonia as "almost the West" are playing their

roles in the narrative of the past. The latter is also associated with the category of "a Baltic inhabitant", which in the collective memory of people marked an oasis where life standard was a little higher and a little more "Western".

We can see that these identifying categories which have more positive connotations have preserved in the collective memory – (partly) accepted though in some cases also rejected or avoided.

Both the categories *"Estonian"* or *"Russian",* which mark ethnocultural belonging and the more neutral category *"an inhabitant of Estonia",* marking the territorial belonging were well internalised by both Estonians and Russians. There are no significant differences in retrospective self-identification of both groups though earlier studies (Haav, quoted in Jakobson 2002) indicate that immediately before the re-establishing of Estonian independence mainly Estonians were identifying themselves as members of an ethnic group, Russians preferred the category "Soviet". Thus, during the transition period, the self-consciousness of Russians has changed and this change is projected retrospectively into their self-consciousness 15 years ago – now it seems to people (they want to remember) that already then they perceived themselves as Russians.

Pan-regional categories, such as *European, world citizen, northerner* are infrequently internalised as the bases for past self-identification. The narrative of the Soviet Union as an enclave closed to the rest of the world is fixed in people's memory.

The same applies to *"a citizen of the Republic of Estonia"* as an identifying category, which associates with the widespread narrative of reconstitution. Though the disappearance of the Republic of Estonia *de jure* was not recognised by foreign countries, *de facto* it had disappeared from the world map and needed to be re-established after the dissolution of the Soviet Union both in terms of collective memory and social practices. Estonians had accepted the identity of defensive ethnocultural minority. The identity of a state's nation is still forming. The results of this study reflect the imagined shift quite vividly – while 88 per cent of respondents identify themselves now as the citizens of the state, then the majority do not use this identification when talking about the past.

These are comparative data from current research and from the survey carried out in 1999 by the authors. The samples are not directly comparable. In 1999 the sample consisted of 400 15–40 year old Russian city dwellers of Estonia. A similar question was asked but

previously respondents were asked to pick only the one category they felt was most suitable. On the basis of indirect comparisons I may advance the hypothesis that the overall structure of identification is perceived to be more heterogeneous in 2003 compared to 1999. Past collective identities are now seen not uni-dimensionally directed by Soviet state ideology. The ethnic and pan-Baltic categories are seen as almost equal options. Thus, one's identity structure is retrospectively perceived as more complicated, more characteristic of an 'open' and less characteristic of a 'closed' society (Vihalemm & Masso 2002; 2003).

Today's identity structure

In this subsection we are going to explore how extensively the aforementioned identification categories are utilised in the self-identification of Estonians and Estonian Russians today and how heterogeneous or homogeneous the perceived identity-structure is.

The results of the survey are shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Present-day internalisation and rejection of identification categories among Estonians (N=940) and Estonian Russians (N=509). Answers are given in per cent.

Today I feel that I am...		certainly	sometimes, partly	not at all	no-answer
...an inhabitant of Estonia	*Estonians*	*86*	*6*	*2*	*1*
	Estonian Russians	84	7	3	6
...an Estonian / a Russian	*Estonians*	*93*	*1*	*1*	*4*
	Estonian Russians	79	11	6	4
...an Estonian/ a Russian language speaker	*Estonians*	*66*	*13*	*13*	*8*
	Estonian Russians	74	14	6	6
...a Baltic inhabitant	*Estonians*	*39*	*40*	*14*	*7*
	Estonian Russians	52	27	15	6
...a citizen of the Republic of Estonia	*Estonians*	*88*	*6*	*1*	*4*
	Estonian Russians	48	17	26	8

...a European	*Estonians*	*34*	*41*	*18*	*7*
	Estonian Russians	22	30	39	8
...a northerner	*Estonians*	*28*	*44*	*21*	*8*
	Estonian Russians	20	24	50	6
...a world citizen	*Estonians*	*23*	*30*	*40*	*7*
	Estonian Russians	14	23	54	8
...an inhabitant of the Estonian Soviet Republic	*Estonians*	*19*	*24*	*48*	*9*
	Estonian Russians	13	12	62	13
...a Soviet person	*Estonians*	*1*	*7*	*83*	*10*
	Estonian Russians	8	15	66	11

Source: Survey "Me, the Media and the World", December 2002- January 2003, Dept. of Journalism and Communication, University of Tartu.

Based on the shares of internalising, rejecting or avoiding (do not know, no answer) answers, we will first look at the retrospective self-identifying strategies of Estonian Russians and then at those of Estonians.

Media analysis indicates that during the first years of Estonian independence, the press used multiple social categories in relation to Estonian Russians. Also, in-depth interviews showed greater variance in the use and interpretation of possible identifying categories (Jakobson 2002). In characterising themselves "today", a considerable proportion of Estonian Russians chose local identity categories.

Eighty-four per cent picked the local territorial category *inhabitant of Estonia* for self-designation. This shows that the concept of locality described above, is worth discussing as one possible path of future identity development of Russians in titular republics.

Also our data support the *ethnisation* thesis. 79 per cent of Russian-speakers identify themselves today as *Russian* and 74 per cent as *Russian language speaker*.

Thus, the local-territorial category with ethno-linguistic specification seems to be the most appropriate term for designating Russians. The empirical research showed that the combination of local and ethnic self-designation, Estonian Russian, was the most internalised category (Vihalemm & Masso 2003).

Still, an important proportion, i.e. 48 per cent, is made up of respondents who *certainly* feel themselves now to be *citizens of the*

Republic of Estonia. Kolstø also admits that in political terms Russians in Estonia seem to identify more with their country of residence than do any other Russian diaspora group in the sample from his survey of Russians living in different former Soviet republics (Kolstø 2000). According to Poppe and Hagendoorn, the average proportion of those Russians who identified themselves exclusively as citizens of their state of residence was highest in the culturally and linguistically 'close' countries like Belarus and Ukraine (Poppe & Hagendoorn 2001). Our findings indicate that local self-identification can also develop when the culture and language are different from those of the titular group. However, the share of those, who identified themselves as 'citizens of Estonia', is relatively small compared to those who chose the category 'inhabitant of Estonia'. According to in-depth interviews (Vihalemm & Masso 2002; 2003) for Estonians the state affiliation presumes acquisition of some Estonian cultural traits, but Russians associate it with formal citizenship, which offers some sense of social security.

A considerable proportion of respondents, 52 per cent, *certainly* feel themselves to be *inhabitants of the Baltics*. The Baltic identity has established a place in people's social memory, but it is also supported by common problems ie protest against Language Law implementation in Russian-language schools in Latvia in autumn 2004. The in-depth interviews (Vihalemm & Masso 2002) indicated that the bases of this affiliation nowadays are common social problems, joint past, a common place of residence and ethnic affiliation. The content of this category is rather neutral and hence it is a proper unifier of Estonian Russians. On the other hand, according to in-depth interviews, this category could turn out to be too neutral, i.e. it doesn't include any significant cultural or civil attributes that could be the bases of this affiliation, nor does it include particular "important others" who could be members of this group. Hence, these results do not necessarily mean the construction of a pan-Baltic affiliation.

Some of the respondents also chose to designate themselves "today" using extraterritorial and culturally wide categories – *northerner*, *European* and *world citizen*. These categories were chosen only by about 1/5 of the respondents. The in-depth interviews show that, for example, the category *European* is connected with Estonia being a part of Europe, and foreign language use, but also with lifestyle elements (Vihalemm & Masso 2002). This corresponds again to the weakest form of cultural identity, referred to as "lifestyle" (Friedman 1994). This trend is relatively new and doesn't offer a universal symbolic framework. Still,

we suppose that the European discourse or Estonian "return to the west" could turn out to be weighty (Masso 2002). This discourse is in reality supported by Estonian aspirations to join the European Union and NATO. Smith finds that the EU today constitutes a far stronger pole of attraction than the Russian Federation (Smith 1998).

The survey results indicate that the categories – *Soviet person* and *inhabitant of the Estonian SSR* are not utilised by Russian-speakers of Estonia very often (Table 2). However, this category, derived from the past, is reported to be quite popular in Kyrgyzstan, Moldova or Kazakhstan (Kosmarskaya 2003; Poppe & Hagendoorn 2001).

In general, the present-day identity structure of Estonians is also rather heterogeneous and quite similar to the picture drawn on the basis of answers of Estonian Russians.

As the data in Table 2 indicate, the local self-identification as an inhabitant of Estonia as well as ethnic and linguistic self-identification are similar among Estonians and Russians, even if for a part of Estonians it seems strange to think about themselves as "the people who speak Estonian" as the ethnicity incorporates implicitly the feature of language.

The usage of the category "Baltic" is somewhat more peculiar of the self-identification of Russians, yet it is still used by both groups.

The category of the "citizen of the Republic of Estonia" is more close to Estonians, which is understandable taking into account the issue of citizenship. A part of the Russian group do not perceive themselves as people of the state or perceive it only in a certain situation (e.g. when being abroad).

The categories "European" and "northerner" are internalised by some Estonians and Russians as important (answer "definitely") or situational (variable "sometimes"). These categories are rejected by Russians more often than by Estonians. The category of a "cosmopolitan" is accepted by both Estonians and Russians mainly as a situational category or is totally rejected.

When comparing the changes in the identification with various categories the data reveal that the biggest decline is in relation to the Soviet category – "Soviet person" and "inhabitant of the Estonian SSR". The ethno-linguistic category, however is stable, as there was a relatively large proportion of those who reported having felt this kind of togetherness already in Soviet times. The category of "Baltic inhabitant" has also been relatively stable. Although the acceptance of the Estonian-centred category has increased, the proportion of this category was also significantly high 15 years ago. The same tendency is valid in the case of the global category.

Thus, we can see that there are no perceived dramatic shifts in the overall structure of collective identities. The Soviet identity is perceived to belong to history, the other options, however, are perceived as having been 'in place' already in the Soviet times. People tend to see the transition period, reflected in the identity options as being har-monious rather than conflicting.

According to inter-category correlations, we can distinguish five categories: global (world citizen, European, northerner); Soviet (inhabitant of Estonia in former Soviet Union), local (Estonian citizen, inhabitant of Estonia); ethno-linguistic (Russian, Russian-speaker) and the regional category (inhabitant of the Baltics).

II Identification strategies

In this part I will analyse general strategies of answering questions (selecting categories), not the nominal categories.
A core question is: which are the general strategies of determining the relation between the past and the present?

A core question of the analysis is: are social changes perceived as traumatic from the perspective of identification (i.e. the co-existence of the new and old culture is creating tension), or are they formed at an individual level as a single comprehensive narrative, i.e. as a narrative of loss, a narrative of conflict, etc?

The analysis is based on the premise that a widely cognised cultural trauma inhibits the formation of (new) collective identities and vice versa, if the changes in people's identity and feeling of belongingness are relatively distinctly determined (also as a narrative of change), then the social prerequisites for the formation of a (new) collective identity are better.

In order to analyse the strategies of self-identification I have divided the analysed variables into two groups: self-identification now ("definitely", "at times, partly" or "not at all") and self-identification in the past ("definitely", "at times, partly" or "not at all" "don't know, don't remember").

In order to differentiate between strategies of self-categorisation, I used a two-stage grouping of respondents and created two new variables in the database.

First, a personal frequency score was assigned to each respondent on the basis of how often he/she chose from amongst 10 options the answer "don't know, don't remember" or did not respond at all to the question "*Please try to recall how you used to feel, and describe yourself 15 years*

ago, at the time of the Estonian SSR?". A personal frequency score could be from 0 to 10.

The analysis revealed that 611 or 60% of 1,025 respondents never chose the answer "don't know" or left the question unanswered. This means that the majority of respondents had a clear position on how they identified themselves in the past. The socio-demographic profile of this group is similar to the Estonian average. The share of the Estonians is a little bigger (69%) and so is the share of those, who assessed the changes of the past 10 years as positive (58%).

196 or 19% of respondents chose "don't know" for single categories, i.e. did not try to evaluate their past from this particular point of view. The socio-demographic profile of this group is similar to the Estonian average.

219 or 21% of respondents used the option "don't know" in 3 to 10 cases, i.e. they have avoided the interpretation of their past from the point of view of these categories more frequently. There are more Russians in this group, less people with higher education and more people who claim that the changes of the past 10 years have been upsetting for them.

Second, a personal frequency score was assigned to each respondent on the basis of how often a person has accepted a category of self-identification (e.g. Soviet person) in the past and at the same time rejected it in the present (by choosing the answer "not at all") and vice versa – how often a person has rejected a category (e.g. "European") in the past (by choosing the answer "not at all") and at the same time accepted it in the present (by choosing the answer "definitely"). As the question concerning self-identification, both in the past and in the present, was asked for the same 10 categories, the personal frequency score of respondents may also range from 0 to 10.

The analysis revealed that 345 or 34% of 1,025 respondents did not use an opposing self-identification in case of any category, i.e. their „self" representation does not include substantial changes in identity: none of the previously dominating categories have completely disappeared from their personal space of identity and none of the previously unimportant categories have become dominating. The socio-demographic profile of this group is similar to the Estonian average. The share of the Estonians (69%) and the share of older people (55 to 74 years) (47%) are slightly above average.

507 respondents (49%) have used the opposing strategy in the case of 1 or 2 categories, i.e. some of the categories were dominating in the

past and have expelled from the respondents' identification space now and some categories, which are dominating now, were missing from the identity repertoire of the past. The socio-demographic profile of this group is similar to the Estonian average. The most often mentioned lost categories were *Soviet person* and *citizen of the Estonian SSR* (previously "definitely" and now "definitely not") and *citizen of the Republic of Estonia, European* and *citizen of the world* (previously "definitely not" and now "definitely").

73 respondents (17%) have used the opposing strategy relatively often (in the case of 3 to 7 categories), i.e. they considered several categories as dominating in the past and "lost" from the present space of meaning or have found that several categories, which are dominating in their present personal identity hierarchy, did not have any cognitive meaning 15 years ago. The categories, which have lost their meaning in the self-identification of this group, are also *Soviet person* and *citizen of the Estonian SSR* (previously "definitely" and now "definitely not") and *citizen of the Republic of Estonia, European* and *citizen of the world* (previously "definitely not" and now "definitely") and, in addition, some more dynamic and regional categories, such as *Baltic person* and *Northern person* and the language based self-identification category *Estonian-speaking/Russian-speaking person*. Compared to the Estonian average, this group is characterised by a bigger share of the Russians (46%), which is logical taking into account how change has affected the Russian-speaking population. The group of opposing self-identification includes bigger number younger people (30–44 yrs) (48%), people with higher education (30%), higher income (at least 4,000 EEK in a month per household member) (23%). Thus, people who are younger, better educated and better off and are content rather than displeased with the changes in Estonia over the past 10 years perceive a change in their personal identity repertoire as more noticeable and even dramatic. Thus, we may say that they construct the picture of their "self" as moving from negative categories of meaning towards more positive categories of meaning (e.g. change from a Soviet person into European).

In order to describe identification strategies at the level of an individual, I divided respondents into groups on the basis of two aggregated index variables using the following matrix:

Frequency of avoiding self-identification in the past. Answer: "don't know" or no answer:

a) in the case of 0 to 2 categories
b) in the case of 3 to 10 categories

Opposition between identification of the past and of the present. For a category, the answer concerning the present was 'I feel that I am definitely …' and the past 'I definitely did not feel that I was….' Or vice versa:

c) in the case of 0 to 2 categories
d) in the case of 3 to 10 categories[3]

The groups were formed according to the principle of matrix in the following combinations: ac; bc; ad; bd.

In the course of data processing it appeared that only 10 respondents belonged to group bd, which could be expected because the matrix was constructed theoretically. As the number of respondents was too small, this group is not included in the further analysis.

Table 3 gives an overview of the socio-demographic profile of the groups.

Group 1 (ad) – respondents who always or in most cases determined the suitability or unsuitability of the categories for themselves in the past (i.e. did not choose or chose 1–2 times the answer "don't know, don't remember" or did not answer the question), yet opposed quite often (in 3 to 7 cases of 10) identifications of the past to those of the present. This means that a respondent in this group thinks that if 15 years ago he/she was definitely a member of a certain group, then today they do not feel this way any more ore the other way round – if a respondent feels that today he/she belongs to a certain group of people, then 15 years ago they definitely did not feel this way.

Thus, the group comprises people who oppose the past to the present and think that categories, which suited well for identification in the past, are unsuitable today and vice versa. I named this group the group, who uses the strategy of contrasting self-determination. When comparing the socio-demographic profile of this group to the Estonian average it appears that the shares of Russian-speaking respondents (46%) and younger people (30–44 yrs) (47%) is bigger than the average and there are fewer people with primary education and more with higher education in this group (12% and 29% respectively).

Group 2 (bc) – respondents who do not oppose the past identification to the present identification (or do it rarely, in 1 or 2 cases) and as a

[3] In empirical data the maximum score was 7 instead of 10 in theoretical model.

more frequent strategy avoid deciding on the suitability/unsuitability of a category in the past (in 3 to 10 cases of ten answered "don't know, don't remember" or did not answer the question) and also avoided opposing the past identification to the present identification (or did it in 1 or 2 cases). As the strategy of identification of people in this group is characterised by more frequent refusal to answer, I named this group the group who uses the strategy of avoiding the interpretation of the past. When comparing the socio-demographic profile of this group to the Estonian average the group is characterised by bigger shares of Russian-speaking respondents (45%), people with secondary education (65%), people with lower income (less than 2,500 EEK in a month per household member) (73%), and smaller share of people who have Estonian citizenship and bigger share of people who have Russian citizenship (13% and 72% respectively). The attitudes of the members of this group toward changes in Estonia over the past 10 years are negative more often than the average (for 35% the changes have been upsetting).

Group 3 (ac) – respondents who always or in most cases determined the suitability or unsuitability of the categories for themselves in the past (i.e. did not choose or chose 1–2 times the answer "don't know, don't remember" or did not answer the question), yet who do not oppose identification in the past to that in the present (or do it only in 1 or 2 cases). In the answers of these people the version marking situational identification "at times, partly" prevailed. It is characteristic of this group that all categories are seen as to some extent existing and legitimate both in the past and in the present. The chosen (retrospective) strategy indicates that there is no clear boundary between the past and the present, which forms a single and frequently ambivalent space of meaning. I named this group, the group who uses a flexible strategy of self-identification. When comparing the socio-demographic profile of this group, to the Estonian average, the group is characterised by bigger share of the Estonians (72%). As regards other background variables, then the socio-demographic profile of this group does not differ from the Estonian average.

Table 3. Socio-demographic profile of groups of different identification strategies. (N=1025). Answers are given in per cent.

	Group who uses the strategy of contrasting self-identification	Group who uses the strategy of avoiding the interpretation of the past	Group who uses flexible strategy of self-identification	Total sample
Estonians	54	55	72	65
Estonian Russians	46	45	28	35
30–44 years	47	35	34	37
45–54 years	25	28	24	25
55–74 years	27	37	41	38
Primary or basic education	12	19	20	19
Secondary education	59	65	56	58
Higher education	29	15	24	23
Citizen of Estonia	85	72	83	81
Citizen of the Russian Federation or another country	8	15	10	11
Unspecified citizenship (alien's passport)	8	12	7	8
Lower income level: up to 2,500 EEK per household member in a month	59	73	63	64
Higher income: more than 4,000 EEK per household member in a month	18	12	16	15
The changes of the past 10 years in Estonia have been pleasurable for me	53	54	41	57
The changes of the past 10 years in Estonia have been upsetting for me	26	22	35	24

Conclusions

Social change does produce disruption of the life-world, bringing about several potentially traumatising events or situations. People use the available pool of cultural resources to interpret those events or situations. The analysis is based on the premise that collective identities represent popular understanding of events – ideologies and symbols "circulating" in the public sphere will be embedded in identities. Therefore collective identification of people (where I belong / don't belong) is a good object of an analysis of transition society and culture.

The aim of the analysis is to explore how people use the identification categories, which are associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union, rapid emergence of national ideology and extension of the Estonian geo-political space, to explain the change in their social status and group belonging.

The first part of the analysis is focused on identification categories today and retrospectively, 15 years ago.

The data reveal that national categories are clearly dominating in self-identification of the Estonians today. Civic, ethnic as well as territorial components are represented in the collective national identification of the Estonians. Retrospective components dominating in the identities of the Estonians are in principle the same: ethnic, territorial, linguistic, civic. Thus, the main change in the dominant categories of the identity of the Estonians has occurred in the civic dimension – the Republic of Estonia and civic identity have become clearly more dominant than the Estonian SSR.

The components dominating in self-identification of the Estonian Russians today are territorial-ethnic categories: "inhabitant of Estonia", "Russian", "Russian-speaker". Retrospective components dominating in the identities of the Estonian Russians are mainly civic, ethnic, territorial. Thus, contrary to the dynamics of the identification of the Estonians, the "self" representations of the Russians are limited to the civic dimension.

Taking into account a theoretical[4] thesis that the dominating identity of Russian-speaking population during the Soviet era was the

[4] Unfortunately, studies on ethnic issues, which were conducted before 1991, are not a very reliable source of comparison.

Soviet identity, the territorial-ethnic identity dominating in the present collective identification indicates quite clearly to the ethno-territorial minoritisation process.

Regional categories are in today's identity space of the Estonians situational rather than dominant identification references. Compared with the retrospective identification, the categories "European" and "Northerner" have moved from the zone of rejection in the past into the today's zone of situational identification.

Regional categories are more dispersed in the identity space of the Estonian Russians. "Baltic" as an identity reference is more important for the Russians than for the Estonians. We may suggest a hypothesis that, in addition to logical territorial connection, "Baltic" also connotes for Russians socio-cultural meanings. The media has probably helped to create these connotations and the image of Pribaltika as the most western region of the Soviet Union, which had higher standard of life than the rest of the country has preserved in the memory of people.

Categories "European" and "Northerner" which have became more important along with the geo-cultural extension of Estonia are in the identity structure of the Estonian Russians more often placed in the zone of rejection. Also, these categories are more often perceived by the Russians as situational, rather than dominant. Thus, we may say that the opening of the geo-cultural space of Estonia has influenced the self-identification of the Russians less than it has influences the self-identification of Estonians.

Global category – "citizen of the world" – is creating more opposition than other regional categories. Thus, global self-determination is rather unfamiliar for the inhabitants of Estonia despite the spread of global media and mass culture.

In general, shifts in the self-image of Estonian population related to geo-cultural opening up of Estonia may be characterised as gradual rather than sudden and they are differentiating (e.g. there is an opinion that Estonia's accession to the EU is a project of the elite) rather than universal.

Categories related to the past and history – "Soviet person" and "inhabitant of the (former) Estonian SSR" have been expelled from the self-image of some people. Thus the local version of the Soviet identity (ESSR identity) is used by part of the Estonians to interpret the post-Soviet cultural space. The identity "Soviet person" has been completely expelled from the identity repertoire of the Estonians.

In the identity space of the Estonian Russians, both categories are represented equally – one fourth of the Estonian Russians feel definitely, or from time to time, that they are Soviet people or inhabitants of the Estonian SSR.

The second part of the analysis is dedicated to general strategies of self-categorisation of individuals, determination the relation between the past and the present, placement of categories in one's memory.

It may be said on the basis of this analysis, that imaginary substantial and dramatic changes in people's image of "self" where previous dominating identification categories disappear and the categories which had no meaning in the past, become dominant are more related to successful adaptation to the changes. This strategy of interpreting changes, though a prism of self-identification – is used by people who have higher education, a better income and a positive attitude towards changes. People, who have difficulties in adapting to the changes and a less secure position in society, tend to avoid interpreting their past.

Both dramatic construction of identity changes, and avoiding interpreting the past (in public), is more characteristic of the Estonian Russians than the Estonians. Opposing strategy characterises younger people who are better adapted to changes; avoiding strategy is more characteristic of older and socially rejected people.

Compared to the Estonian Russians, the identity space of the Estonians is often more heterogeneous – the categories of the past and the present are not so clearly distinguishable. Thus we may say that for the Estonians there are more chances to identify themselves and less need to leave out some categories.

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Do We Understand Them? Experience of Estonian-speaking Students from Fieldwork in Narva

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During the past few years I have happened to be in Narva – a predominantly Russian-speaking town on the eastern border of Estonia – more and more often. Some of my friends have moved there and first I just visited them. These were usual pleasure trips and I did not think much of what Narva as a town and its inhabitants were like. I was not looking for the different or similar, neither did I contemplate about whether something irritated or astonished me.

Three years ago (in 2002) we launched a project *Narva Biographies* together with the Pro Narva Foundation, with the aim to collect the life stories of Narva inhabitants and through publishing them to bring the citizens of Narva nearer to the other residents of Estonia. At the same time my own research became more and more related to Narva. As I grew to be more interested in this town, I started to contemplate about my Narva-experience and the emotions that mingling with local people and the things I saw there had given rise to. In the spring of 2003 I delivered a lecture at the Narva College of the University of Tartu about Estonian biographies, and it was at that time that I started writing my so-called "Narva Diary". The first entry in this diary dates from April 1, 2003, and starts as follows:

> *Yesterday I took the 11.30 coach from Tartu to Narva. Already when getting on the coach I merged into the Narva language environment, or, to be honest, this language environment embraced me into itself already in*

Tartu. When I asked the driver – of course in pure Estonian – if the bus was going to stop in Narva also before the coach terminal, he looked at me as if he did not understand a word of what I was saying. First he offered me the timetable because he thought that I wanted to know what time the bus was due in Narva. Yet, this was not what I was interested in. I tried to ask my question in Russian, but failed. At the moment I could not recall the Russian word for "before". After a while, the driver seemed to understand my question and suggested different stops: Energetics, McDonald's. As I did not know which of them was the nearest to the college, I was able to produce a sentence, "Mne nada universitetski kolledzh" (I need to go to the university college). The driver nodded contentedly and said, "Tagda McDonald's" (It is McDonald's then).

As I had been to Narva already so many times before and was, in principle, acquainted with the language environment there, I was not upset by this situation. I was angry rather with myself and my poor knowledge of Russian. Yet, I became interested in how the Estonians who are not frequent visitors in Narva react on the linguistic and cultural situation there.

In the summer of 2003 the Estonian National Museum, Tartu University and Pro Narva Foundation organized joint fieldwork with the aim to collect life-stories of the citizens of Narva. The interviewers were ethnology students of the University of Tartu and also students of the University's Narva College. Most of the students from Tartu had a very poor knowledge of Russian; also, their earlier acquaintance with Narva was quite negligible. Therefore it was an ideal group to get an inkling of the Estonians' Narva-experience and also their Russian-experience in Estonia. So we asked all the fieldwork participants to keep a diary and write down all their thoughts and emotions they had during these ten days. Ethnologist Heiki Pärdi is valued diaries written by students, he writes: "They also include sharp-sighted observations about reality often not noticed by their more experienced colleagues" (1995: 85).

Recently, the debates concerned with the methods of ethnology have been interested in the concept of reflexivity dealing with the researcher's self-consciousness at their meeting with the ethnological "research object" – the informant. It is emphasized that the researcher is not a detached observer, but they have an impact on the "research object". During fieldwork the ethnologist, observing other people's lives, also participates in them, and each day at fieldwork is influenced by its participants and environment (Reinvelt 2002: 17). The main topics that were discussed were related to language proficiency (or, actually, with the lack of it) and integration connected with it, the informants' attitude towards Estonia and the Estonian language, different cultural behaviour and conducting interviews.

When meeting other people, you can see more clearly what you are or are not yourself. Contrasts strengthen one's identity. In the case of fieldwork, besides studying others, you also deal with self-analysis (Ehn & Klein 1994: 30, etc.). The aim of the article is to treat on the basis of diary notes the Estonian students' will to communicate with the Russian-speaking citizens of Narva in order to understand their mental world, ideals and everyday behaviour and through this analyze their own readiness to integrate and understand the local inhabitants. Although fieldwork was done – considering the geographical border – in the students' homeland, they were actually in an alien environment as regards the ethnic, linguistic and cultural environment – as if in a foreign country.

Language and integration

When making plans for the camp, we suspected that it would be quite difficult to find Russian-speaking students from Tartu, but, in order to communicate with the citizens of Narva, it did not suffice to speak Estonian. According to the data of Census held in 2000 (www.stat.ee), 2.9 % of the citizens of Narva spoke Estonian as their mother tongue, and 13.9 % – as a foreign language. So, 16.8 % or less than a fifth of the local population is able to speak Estonian. Therefore we decided to organize our fieldwork as an integration camp, combining the interviewers in pairs so that one of them would be from Tartu and the other – from Narva College. The one from Tartu was supposed to play the part of an interviewer with methodological skills and the one from Narva with the knowledge of both Russian and Estonian – would be a language mediator.

Fieldwork diaries yield quite detailed information about the first impression that the students from Narva made on their Tartu counterparts and about how the students were divided into pairs.

> *First we were given a superficial introduction of the students of Narva College, who were supposed to become our peers in conducting the interviews, and it was decided to meet at the local pub called Modern at eight in the evening. At Modern the initial integration took place. We selected our partners. Kerli and Tanel were able to snatch the best Russian girls – Jana and Nastja – who were actually very difficult to be considered as Russians. Maria took Anna and I asked Vladimir to be my peer. The choice proceeded from the fact that Vova was the last Russian who understood Estonian (or, at least, at first it seemed so).*

> *In the evening at Modern we all put on our new shirts, had a group photo taken (by a journalist) and grabbed peers for ourselves. I had cast an eye on*

a pleasant girl already during the day, and we made up a pair. Her name is Anna, she is 21, comes from Kohtla-Järve and majors in English philology. She understands Estonian well and speaks a little as well. During the evening we integrated with Narva students quite successfully, speaking in Estonian-Russian-English.

First it was also quite clear that the students from Tartu needed to be assisted by the local ones, as in most cases their knowledge of Russian was so poor that some of them could not even understand what the informants were saying, not to mention conversing and conducting an interview.

At the other end of the house an old man and a woman were sitting on a bench in front of the door. The former agreed to talk to us. Aleks was holding a dictaphone in his hand and a questionnaire on his knees and asked him to start. He did not talk long, for about twenty minutes. I was sitting on the stairs and listening silently, trying to understand everything. I did not succeed entirely.

The informant herself was extremely emotional; her eyes kept welling with tears. But she only talked in answer to Jana's long questions. It was bad that it was quite difficult for me to follow and understand. At times I felt rather hopeless.

However, to our great surprise we found out that the knowledge of Estonian of a part of the students from Narva College was so poor that they could not communicate with their Estonian counterparts. The Estonians' methodological skills were of no use as they were not able to forward them to their peers.

My peer turned out to be Aleks, who does not speak Estonian and, as it became clear, does not understand it, either. And then there was me, who had had contacts with Russian only at school and none during the past year! /…/ I got up, thinking that if nothing else helped, I could resort to English when speaking with Aleks, as you have to communicate somehow.

From the point of view of the integration camp, the aim was to arouse a feeling among both the parties that they belonged to one and the same "we"-group. Yet, instead of a uniform fieldwork group actually two detached ones on the basis of ethnicity and language proficiency existed. The opposition between "we" – "the others", which is so much spoken about in the studies of ethnic complexity (see: Ytrehus 2001; Berg, Reinvelt, Ytrehus 2002), occurred at that moment not in the relations

between the interviewer and the interviewee, but also inside the group of interviewers. Quite soon, the integration pairs started to fall apart and in reality interviews were conducted by pairs of ethnic Russians or ethnic Estonians. Also neither of the parties demonstrated a desire to integrate during the social events that took place in the period of fieldwork. Eventually it turned out that Estonians kept to themselves and Russians also mingled with one another or with the Estonians who could speak Russian. Actually it was rather segregation then integration what happened.

> *We decided to finish the integration project. Maria's Anna is not here and we would like to conduct an interview together. In the style – a bit of methods, but no language.*

> *Excursion day or the one when we are supposed to integrate. There are two buses: ours and the one from Narva. It is emphasized long before that we should mingle. But we don't feel like it. It is too comfortable in our own bus to bustle around.*

However, on the third or fourth fieldwork day entries appear in Estonian students' diaries, which admit the improvement of their Russian and the fact that actually local people have even a more favorable attitude towards ethnic Estonian pairs and do not mind their poor Russian. Sometimes poor Russian even came in handy and aroused interest in the potential informants, who wanted to know why young people, who did not speak Russian well, were standing on their doorstep. Probably it does not happen too often in Narva that an Estonian, who does not come from Narva and does not speak Russian, rings the doorbell and wants to know about your life.

> *Work wise, I can say that today we got two interviews. For a moment I had the feeling that my ability to listen to Russian has improved, but it is for tomorrow to see.*

> *Anna had to go home to Kohtla-Järve and we were able to go with Dagmar. Actually, we had already had a plan to find out how an "Estonian pair" succeeded. /…/ We started to comb apartments and succeeded quite well. Estonians speaking broken Russian were viewed with curiosity asked to come in and enquired what they wanted.*

Language problems also arise in other connections, the most predominating being situations in different service enterprises, where the Russian-

speaking staff was not able to understand their customers and the Estonia-speaking customers would not (referring to the law on language) or, in the case under discussion, could not speak Russian. And after the first confrontation everything else that happened in the same café or store became irritating as well.

> *A funny morning. It is seven minutes past eleven. I am sitting in a German Pub, with a cup of black coffee in front of me. The bespectacled young man behind the counter reacted to my greeting and order given in Estonian with a question in Russian expressing misunderstanding. I repeated my order once more, this time in the language of communication suggested by him. I put a hundred-crown note on the counter, to which he said that they had no change. The coffee cost ten crowns. I said there was nothing to do then. Eventually he sent the waitress to change the note, – maybe it was still important for him that people would visit the bar where he worked? I was really ready to go somewhere else and the coffee there was not one of the best, anyway.*

Attitude towards Estonia

When the informant happened to be a person very clearly undervaluing Estonia, their viewpoints were certainly jotted down in fieldwork diaries.

> *I dropped into the hostel before the lunch-break; when I asked the warden for my key, she started talking to me and then I got an extremely weird opinion about Estonia and Russia. To summarize it, there were three things that the old lady kept emphasizing:*
> *1. The world is in a constant process of changing;*
> *2. In the future only three languages/cultures will be predominating – English, Russian and French (anyway, she found that Estonians are a bit arrogant as they do not want to study Russian);*
> *3. Estonia is like a small prostitute – studying Estonian history, it has to be admitted that Estonia has been ruled by a great number of alien powers: Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Poland and Russia. She thinks it is the same way in prostitution – hookers have to meet their clients' demands, having no much opportunity to refuse.*

A direct conflict of worldviews arose between the interviewer and the interviewee. From the human point of view, it is understandable that nobody likes to listen to derogatory sentiments about their nation and country. One would like to stand to defense and present objections; yet, while conducting a biographical interview, you cannot do this kind of things. You cannot obtrude your opinions and viewpoints on other people, because, first, the aim is to get to know their life story together with

their experience, principles and values. Second, arguing might deprive the informants of their wish to give any interview at all. In this case, however, arguing was also hindered by the poor command of Russian, as it did not enable to substantiate the interviewer's viewpoints with sufficient argumentation. As at the time of the interview it was not possible to present one's own viewpoints, the fieldwork diary served as a good means for letting go of all the emotions accumulated during the day.

Problems were also caused by the division between "we" and "you", which the informants frequently used. Living in Estonia, many Russian-speaking citizens of Narva, while speaking about matters in Estonia, use the formulation "your", e.g., "your President", whereas they say "our Putin" about the President of Russia.

> *The old man agreed to speak, although he made me understand that he did not feel like it. He was an old veteran, who had been telling his war reminiscences quite a few times. The story ran fluently and he immediately fetched an album from a cupboard with war photos. For the interviewee Soviet time had been very rosy and Estonian independence made him only shrug his shoulders. Nothing was said about "us", only "your government" and "your country". The attitude he demonstrated was as if he had lived in Russia and Narva bordered on a "self-proclaimed" small Estonian state. The old man was emotional and temperamental, constantly banging the table with his fist. He said several times that that was it that he would not say anything else, and then we asked something in our broken Russian and he listened to our questions with interest and kindly went on talking. He got especially carried away when we asked about the veterans' privileges and also about parades.*

The cases when the informants had openly expressed their desire to get the Soviet order and communism back were also jotted down. For the young Estonians of today it is rather difficult to imagine that for some people life in the Soviet Union could have been much happier than retirement in the town situated on the eastern border of the Republic of Estonia.

> *We are heading for Tallinn Street. We pick out a random door and happen to be at the doorstep of a true communist. The motto "piece and respect" gets more and more difficult to observe. The old man wearing a singlet and blue sagging sweatpants stares at us impudently and clearly claims that Estonian culture is poor, expecting us to confirm it. He tells us about the Communist Party as a thoroughly honest and uncorrupted organization. Besides that, his whole family looks like a puzzle. He himself looks at least*

ten years younger than he really is, and so do his mother and daughter. Nobody knows how old the cat is. But it is very good at circus tricks. Communists are very capable, they make even cats perform tricks. I wonder where this kind of people comes from.

The first informant of this day left an unforgettable impression on us – it was a true communist. /…/ He was radiating self-confidence, he looked directly into our eyes and said twice, very clearly and slowly, "Estonian culture is so very poor!" For him Stalin was the great father and in his opinion Soviet ideology had not lost its fair position even now.

As the predominant dream of Estonians is that the other nations residing here would recognize and accept the mental world, ideals and behavioural patterns inherent to Estonians, it is difficult to put up with the fact that in reality this kind of changes do not occur overnight.

A great part of Estonian society still lives in the imagination that in historical perspective Estonia has been a homogeneous nation state. In reality it has never been so, as the Baltic Germans, Coastal Swedes, Russians at Lake Peipsi (Peipus) and Ingrian Finns made this country ethnically multinational. According to the data of Census held in 1934 was 11.8 % from other nations than Estonians (*Eesti arvudes* 1937). During the past decade, humanitarians and social scientists elsewhere in the world have expressed rather critical opinions about the idea of the nation state, claiming that they did not crop up in an indeterminate cultural universe, but were developed through unity based on political rhetoric and power. The state was rather the first to be established, later on laying a foundation to the creation of collective identity – national sense of belonging inside administrative state borders (Anttonen 2001: 63). The Estonian state, with which the citizens of Narva are supposed to identify themselves, is rather young, founded in 1991. The citizens of Narva, being of different nationalities, also lack the historical sense of continuity with the Estonian state that existed before World War II. For them by way of experience, there are two Estonias – Soviet Estonia and present Estonia. Soviet Estonia as part of the Soviet Union shaped their worldview; yet, in order to get used to the independent Estonia, to change their worldview and renounce the former values they need more time. Only after that they can start creating their collective identity, which connects them with the Estonian state and Estonians.

At the same time the attitude of all the interviewees towards Estonia was not solely negative. There were also those who were patriots of Estonia. Also meeting with different informants had an impact on the fieldworkers' opinions about Russians and confuted quite a few stereotype

imaginations of Russians as people hostile towards Estonia who would not learn Estonian in principle.

> *She expressed very nicely her thoughts and feelings about Estonia as her homeland, despite the fact that she was a Russian (born in Russia).*

> *That day we conducted an interview. We found a rather cheerful elderly redhead lady in front of a house in Võidu Street, and she was willing to talk to us. This informant was unbelievably friendly and Estonian-minded and confuted quite a few of my national stereotypes. Bit by bit I started to understand why Narva Russians do not speak Estonian.*

Local cultural environment

As is the case with all fieldwork, so also in Narva, besides collecting biographies and interviewing people, there was some time left for getting acquainted with local life. At first sight Narva seems to be like any other Estonian town. Street-signs are in Estonian, cars have Estonian license numbers and they are just like those you can see in Tallinn. The town is clean and well taken care of, people wear decent clothes. Yet, the eye of an attentive observer or the one who stays there longer, catches something that you cannot encounter so often elsewhere in Estonia. What mainly attracted attention was people's behaviour in different everyday situations.

> *It is afternoon and on the benches in front of blocks of flats mostly elderly people are sitting, either alone or in groups, chatting. /…/ In the courtyard of a block of flats in Kreenholmi Street a group of men are sitting, playing dominoes. The nearing evening brings more and more young people outside. Streets abound in cats. Some window frames are painted blue.*

The fieldwork diaries reveal that the students were mostly impressed by the nightclubs and pubs of Narva. Probably the things that they saw there were so very different from the ones experienced elsewhere in Estonia, that they attracted attention and stirred up emotions. The things mainly written about were the visitors' behaviour and clothes. People's behaviour in different situations serves as the primary source of information, on the basis of which conclusions are made about their character (see: Wellros 1988). Here are a few examples:

> *In the evening we went to Modern and then on to Tabletka. First Modern. From among the pubs and eating places seen in Narva, Modern is the most common one. The crowd there is usual, according to our standards, the music is almost always normal and the food – you can even miss it in*

Tallinn and Tartu. Service is also high-level. Yet, when staying in Narva, Modern is, first and foremost, the place to start a party, as you cannot encounter "real culture" there! For that you have to go to Tabletka. "Oh kakie devushki i malchiki." (Oh, what girls and boys!) From the first visit, which did not by far remain the last, we had a real cultural charge: working women especially attractively made up, wearing tight glittering shirts, who knew dancing styles I had never seen; men 150 cm tall, with black moustaches, wearing leather jackets, women on the wrong side of middle age dancing with one another, etc. Now this was real Narva.

In the evening we were again at Modern and moved on to Tabletka, which is one of the most radical places in Narva. Dagmar and me had planned to go to the hostel and hit the bed, but we agreed to drop in for a moment. This "moment" dragged quite long, as it was a real working people's party (August 20 – a day off), the kind I haven't seen before. Hysterical Russian music (Verka), dancing and merrymaking. Old men with moustaches and toughies, old Russian women and "worn-out" women in fishnet shirts. The best evening at Tabletka during the whole stay in Narva (we became regular customers…).

The fieldwork diaries reveal that the preferences of Narva and Tartu students for spending their free time were relatively different. While the students of Tartu enjoyed Narva nightlife, then the local ones did not value it highly. For the former the things that they experienced in the pubs were an exotic experience in a certain meaning and the people and situations seen there symbolized the "real" Russian culture.

We again proceeded to Tabletka. It is important to mention that Narva students could not appreciate the charms of Tabletka at all. Instead they went to the amusement park, whose charms were wasted on the students of Tartu. Integration had failed again. The evening finished in Tabletka. /…/ In Tabletka we merged completely and got a new friend – a former welder and a present pensioner called Ljudmilla. The agile "auntie" was absolutely enthusiastic about us, and she couldn't praise us enough, repeating how nice people Estonians were.

Interviewing

Although the students of Tartu had done fieldwork before and also interviewed people, this situation was in a way still novel for them. Already formerly we discussed the issues of language environment and the necessity to conduct interviews in a foreign language or, in this concrete case, Russian. In addition to this, the students had received their former

fieldwork experience from rural regions, yet, Narva is a town with the population of about 70,000 and in town people are used to living more by themselves, secluded.

> *It was a hard day. In the morning we went to almost the other end of the town. People there were really nasty. Nobody let us in and they told us the usual things: we have nothing interesting to tell you, our life is so commonplace, boring. This dispirited us for the whole day.*

Yet, everybody was satisfied when the day was successful and they were able to conduct at least one interview of a considerable length, whose prerequisite was a good story-teller.

> *Actually I rather like interviewing, perceiving just any person. It is very boring to look for an informant, yet, it feels good at the end of the day if I have found some good ones.*

Finding an interviewee became the greatest problem for most of the students. For many of them it was psychologically relatively difficult to appear at the doorstep of a stranger and ring the bell there. Conclusions about the interviewee started to be made already before the real encounter and also at the moment when they opened the door and the conversation had even not started yet. People always exchange information, even when they do not utter a word. In this case it is the unintentional communication and the sender of the message does not even know that they have yielded some information about themselves. Yet, the receptor reacts to it and this influences further communication (Wellros 1988: 54).

> *There is a middle-aged woman in Kreenholmi Street. The door to her apartment is really weird. I think it is a family of drunkards. I feel prejudice storming in me. We knock at the door, as there is no doorbell. A woman, holding a knife smeared with meat in her hand answers the door. An suddenly all the prejudices disappear, as Nadezhda seems to be very friendly and obliging.*

Although the students from Tartu had also conducted interviews earlier on, a biographical interview was new experience for them. Formerly they had used questionnaires, which in a certain way make interviewing easier, as the questions are then restricted by a concrete topic. But how do you ask a random informant to tell their whole life story to a complete stranger? Both parties have to overcome a psychological barrier, and besides that, again language problems occurred, as each interview consisted of two

parts. In the first part the interviewees told their life stories in free form, with the length varying from ten minutes to one-and-a-half hours, depending on the narrators' ability to present their stories and mediate the past. In the second part, however, the interviewer had to ask supplementary questions proceeding from the story told. This presumed understanding of the first part and also an ability to formulate questions. Just in case, we had distributed to the students Russian-language questionnaires concerned with the topic of Soviet time, which they were able to use as ancillary materials.

> *During our first interview I realized that it was quite difficult to participate actively when Russians spoke with one another (so quickly!). I let Anna lead the interview, which lasted for about fifteen minutes – by then the auntie had given a short survey of her life and Anna was ready to say "Thank you, bye!". Then I said "padazhdite minutochku" (wait a bit) and signaled to Anna that she should ask some more questions about the Soviet time and things like that (I pointed with my finger to the questionnaire in Russian) and the old woman rattled on for at least half an hour. I could have asked myself, but I was afraid that the auntie would not understand me.*

In an ideal case the questionnaire was really used as ancillary material, yet, in the worst case the interview went on in the form of questions and answers. Generally the students of Tartu understood better the methodology of biographical interviews, while the ones from Narva tried to follow the given questions too carefully.

> *Questionnaires were given as aids, with the recommendation to keep from reading from them. There was a problem with the latter – it seemed that the Russians did not understand it. Later on, when talking to the others, they complained namely about that. My own partner was also following the questionnaire.*

In spite of the initial difficulties in finding informants and understanding Russian-speaking people, most of the students who participated in fieldwork, estimated the experience gained from interviewing and staying in Narva as positive. If we leave out a few more extreme informants, the people they met were mostly nice and kind. In these situations different nationality acquired even a positive coloring.

> *The last interview on that day had been agreed about already earlier. It*

was an elderly Russian woman, who worked in a kindergarten. It was clear that she had dedicated herself to this work. Her home was again Slavonic-style modern, very clean and left a good impression. /…/ After the interview she treated us to tea and cakes and sandwiches and sweets. In her case it was something that I imagine as a real Russian soul – friendly, hospitable and thoroughly positive.

And finally, maybe the most essential experience that the students of Tartu gained was that while staying in Narva and speaking with the local people about their lives both retrospectively and also concerning the present moment, they developed a real understanding of them – of why the local population does not feel themselves closely connected with Estonia and why they do not speak Estonian.

In the next house we found the last informant of the day, a young woman born in 1976. From her story I remember one sentence, "My homeland is Narva." Actually it is right. I started to feel myself that Narva is neither Estonia nor Russia. It is like an independent segment between the two countries.

This informant was unbelievably friendly and Estonian-minded and confuted quite a few of my national stereotypes. Bit by bit, I started to realize why the Russians of Narva do not speak Estonian.

Conclusions

In order for the integration to be successful, both parties have to be willing to integrate with one another. Our little experiment of the co-existence of people of two nations and moving together towards a common aim proved that if we lack the language of communication, everything else becomes impossible. It is essential to emphasize here that the younger generation of Estonians does not speak Russian any more and therefore for them it is soon not an issue of "unwillingness", but "incapability" to communicate with the Russian-speaking population of Estonia in any connection or at any level. If the other party's knowledge of Estonian remains at the present level, the split between these two communities is certain to expand.

In spite of their initial linguistic difficulties, the Estonian students managed wonderfully in the Russian-speaking environment of Narva and were rather open to communication and contacts with the local population. They mostly regarded their stay in Narva as positive experience, which

expanded their worldview and helped them to understand better those inhabitants of Estonia who do not speak Estonian as their mother tongue.

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Work as the Focus of Socialist Everyday Life – Slogans and Reality

Anu Kannike

Arbeit im Sozialismus – Arbeit im Postsozialismus. Erkundungen zum Arbeitsleben im östlichen Europa. Hg. Klaus Roth. Freiburger Sozialanthropologische Studien 1. Münster, LIT Verlag 2004, 433 pp.

Work held the dominant position in Marxist-Leninist ideology and the concept of Socialist statehood. It was regarded as the basis of the class struggle and, thus, the premise of all human progress. Work was considered to be the basis of culture, an indispensable precondition that had to shape a new, Socialist, man. Thus, work and working life formed the essence of "Socialist lifestyle". Workers were in the foreground in the image of that society and a perfectly functioning grand enterprise became a symbol of the state (Niedermüller 2004: 27). Therefore, it seems natural that the ethnologists studying the Socialist period often define everyday life, in that era, through work.

"Work in Socialism – Work in Post-socialism" is a collection of 26 articles, in German and English, mostly studying the working culture, strategies and practices emerging out of discrepancies between ideology, politics and everyday reality. The contributions are connected with the FOROST association of projects,which focused on changes and continuity in East-and South-European transition countries, as well as on papers presented at a previous conference held, in April 2002, at the University of Munich, under the leadership of Prof. Klaus Roth.

Most of the articles have a historical-anthropological character, but sociological and legal aspects are also studied. Whereas the main emphasis is laid on the Socialist world of work and its consequences, still felt today, some articles also look at the new forms of work and enterprise characteristic of global capitalism. Most contributions investigate the Socialist period on the basis of thematic and biographical interviews, but several authors (for example, M. Parikova, R. Ivanova, L. Dzięgiel, L. Lissjutkina) also rely on their personal experience. In addition to the basic theoretical articles by K. Roth and P. Niedermüller, the source material of

specific case studies mostly comes from Bulgaria (8), Czechoslovakia (5) and (former) Soviet Russia (4). Three articles study the Socialist period in Poland and Estonia and one in Yugoslavia.

Work plays a universally dialectical role in human culture: on the one hand, a burden, compulsion and trouble, but on the other hand fun, self-realisation and an activity of liberating character.

In Socialist culture, the ideological double role is added: glorification and ritualisation of work, but, at the same time, work as a mechanism of control and repression. As Socialism progressed, the disruption between work rhetoric and work reality deepened. However, in this space of tension, people lived their everyday life, tried to manage, be successful and make a career.

In everyday practice, the central role of the workplace was paradoxically connected with its numerous extra-professional functions – the workplace was a focus of re-distribution of goods and services, social security, control mechanisms, elongation of the state and the party. In many important aspects, especially in the ambition for all-embracing control and existential mutual connection of all workers, the Socialist world of work is actually much more similar to Feudalism than to Western Capitalism (Lissjutkina 2004: 180).

Public and private, a feeling of social stability and social humiliation were mixed. A fixed hierarchy was also characteristic of the Socialist world of work: industrial production occupied the central position and the moral and symbolic value of physical work was considered to be much higher than that of intellectual work.

Among the topics discussed, the question, in which way the political, legal, economic and social practice of everyday, so-called real Socialism, shaped the forms, functions and conditions of work and how those concerned perceived this process that lasted for decades, is of central importance. The ideological leader of the collection, Prof. Klaus Roth considers it extremely important to direct "the empirical ethnological-sociological look towards how the relationship between Socialist world of life and world of work is described and to what extent did work and worklife influence and shape everyday life and lifeworld in real Socialism" (Roth 2004: 15).

How did people, in different Socialist countries, experience the basic principles of Socialist work, for example, the right to work, work duties and Socialist moral of work, the cult of physical work? To what extent can we speak about self-fulfilment or creativity in the case of everyday work? What kind of expectations and imagination developed in connection with

work, how was it expressed? Or, in other words – one should try to get a picture of how the cultural arrangement of the Socialist world of work looked.

Work mediated norms and values, created social networks, caused social prestige or social contempt. It can even be said that everyday working practice liberated itself from the ideological rhetorics of the Socialist state and created its own norms and hierarchies (Niedermüller 2004: 28). It was the enormous informal space, between clearly defined legal and criminal spaces, which helped the people to fight against stagnation and social paralysation. Real life went on in this informal territory (Lissjutkina 2004: 183).

The set of questions, concerning how such forms of behaviour and ways of thought, developed over decades, are related to the present day is also important. The transition period, lasting for more than ten years in the post-Socialist countries, has shown that, namely, in the sphere of work the heritage of the old regime is especially problematic. Here the question arises as to what extent continuity plays a role, to the extent changes are preponderant, but also how decisive a role do the intra-generational differences play. It is interesting to analyse who, and in which field, adopts the Western models and where the new cultural forms emerge. The workers develop new everyday strategies in the field of tension between new demands and native cultural tradition.

Professor Peter Niedermüller argues that the essential task of ethnologists, studying Socialism as a cultural system, is to break the myth about Socialism as a unitary and homogeneous block existing in Western imagination and decriptions. Actual Socialism took very different forms in different countries, different historical periods and represented various social realities and spaces of experience. In this context, Niedermüller stresses the revolutionary significance of the 1970s, arguing that namely, in this period, a new cultural logic developed in the Socialist countries – the political as well as cultural understanding that Socialism cannot be changed. But at the same time, one got more and more information about life in the West and culturally coded ideas and conceptions of how one actually ought to live, an ideal of the "good life" developed. For the wide social strata, the unfulfilled dream of consumption remained a motive power and, under this influence, new life projects and identity models were formed (Niedermüller 2004: 34–35).

In my opinion, the group of articles concerning social communication, the development of social networks and their influence at workplace (articles by Milena Benovska-Sabkova, Kirsti Jõesalu and Marketa

Spiritova) is theoretically most challenging and analyse the inner functioning of Socialist work culture in an effective manner. Work/workplace is analysed as a specific space of communication where both gender and generational differences play a role. The articles of this group also reveal strong national peculiarities in work relations – whereas family (nepotism) relations and clientelism that, in principle, have remained the same despite the regimes were the strongest in South-Europe, in the case of Estonia and Czechoslovakia the authors stress the importance of small groups of solidarity based on trust and similar worldview, created on the horizontal axis.

The article by Milena Benovska-Sabkova characterises the essence of Socialism through social networks created at the workplace, describing how the networks were established, what kind of role they played and how they reproduced clientelism characteristic of pre-war Bulgaria. The author's descriptions give evidence that the networks were usually based on friendship and more open communication was usually limited to a small group of closer colleagues, some 5–6 people. A small group guaranteed security, since personal trust played the key role in concluding a friendship. The development of a friendship-based network at work illustrates Socialist alienation – "locking" oneself into restricted social niches. It was a strategy of constructing parallel worlds. The functioning of a small work group, as an informal coalition, also expresses adaptation, mitigating the frustration caused by social change, the fact that it was no longer possible to apply traditional cultural strategies (Benovska-Sabkova 2004: 118).

Escapism, characteristic of Socialist everyday life, and the informal connections intensified by this, created, on the one hand, a favourable social micro-climate, but, on the other hand, promoted the development of clientelism. The connections created, at the workplace, were used for coping with Socialism in general. Friendship could be transformed into social capital or economic ressources. Thus, clientelism, at the workplace, became a powerful instrument of paraphrasing social relations and changing social status. Behind the curtain of social uniformity informal, but very effective social and economic stratification developed.

Kirsti Jõesalu's article (2004), on the practices and strategies in social networks, emphasises the diversity of communication strategies in the Socialist world of work. Despite the uniform surface there existed various different groups and many-sided formal as well as informal forms of communication. On the basis of biographical interviews, the author describes remarkable generational and gender differences in worldviews –

for example, work occupies a much more important, even dominant position in the biographies of the older generation. Whereas women's lifestories can be described as deficit biographies, because they deal a lot with everyday problems and related connections, for men the process of social development is much more important and critical generalisations about the past dominate in their reflections.

Discussing issues like whom did one socialise with at the workplace and how important communication at workplace was, the Soviet world of work is characterised as an intermediate space between official and public and the informal network. The groups were based on solidarity, trust, communication (information, common interests) as well as mutual economic gain, for example, information about opportunities to obtain certain products. Officially permitted formal groups and the informal network of relations intermingled at the workplace. One also has to consider that nostalgia probably strengthens the dominating memory pictures about very closed collectives and close networks.

Marketa Spiritova's article presents an extremely interesting detailed analysis of the network connecting Czech intellectuals after the repression following the events of 1968. The author focuses on how the intellectuals managed to (re)construct their lifeworld in a situation where free choice was not possible, how they overcame the contradiction between expectations and experience. Whereas earlier the intellectuals' network of mutual connections only served the interests of scientific discourse, after the repression it also served as a concrete support structure for everyday life. Spiritova describes how those who were dismissed, from the positions of lecturers, interpreters or editors, created alternative parallel worlds in their free time, at night, in homes or under pseudonyms. Underground publications and non-official historical studies, collecting and preserving national memory became widespread forms of independent activities. The aim of such strategies was to create a miniature world of culture and science, which would be more genuine and true than the official world (Spiritova 2004: 344). The creation of such a parallel world made it possible for them to continue work, corresponding to their qualifications and made life meaningful.

Those expelled from their habitual enivironment could quite rapidly adapt themselves to a world alien to them, to cope, preserving their norms and values. With the help of analytic thought and mental flexibility they discovered the weak points of the system and made alien structures their own by applying their creative potential. Spiritova concludes that friendship and personal trust proved to be the most important basis for

surviving Socialism. Collective coping strategies were more effective than individual ones. Opportunities for ideological resistance were created not by ignoring the system or leaving it, but, knowing the system well enough, adapting it to one's own needs (ibid: 346).

A number of articles study the organisation of work and brainwashing mechanisms under Socialism, as well as their reception by contemporaries, and in historical perspective. The elder generation's nostalgic view of the past, regretting lost stability and the sense of security are the common themes here. At the same time, ideological rituals, aiming to implement official norms, are mentioned so seldom as if they had never existed (for example, articles by P. Petrov and P. Markovic). Speaking about Soviet work mentality, V. Popkov argues that, until today, Soviet people carrying Soviet values work in many enterprises. The analysis of Monika Golonka-Czajkowska about the Socialist role model in the memories of Polish metal workers allows the conclusion that stereotypic conceptions about party members, in the Socialist period, are often transmitted to contemporary party activists as well. The workers of a former press combine in Slovakia, interviewed by L. Herzanova, are frustrated by the need to constantly re-adapt. Freedom is something suspicious since people actually don't know how to handle this.

Another group of articles looks at the Socialist experience from the viewpoint of a specific social group. Ene Kõresaar and L. Dzięgiel respectively write about the world of teachers and specialists who worked abroad. Whereas Dzięgiel's article presents a conspective picture of the hardships and advantages of living abroad, E. Kõresaar gives a much deeper analysis of the moral dilemmas, which teachers had to face and the strategies of coping with these dilemmas in the different stages of Soviet rule. The emphasis on longer dynamics clearly demonstrates that application of comparative-historical analysis also gives good results for understanding the lifeworld of the so-called mature Socialism.

Relying on the memories of women, who worked at universities and research institutions of major cities, Larisa L. Lissjutkina presents a large-scale analysis of a woman's position in the world of work in Soviet Russia. According to Lissjutkina, the identity structure of Soviet women was multi-dimensional as a result of heterogeneous complexes of ideas and traditions. On the one hand, one propagated emancipation and equality of rights, on the other hand, the cliché of a woman's basic role as the man's helper and mother predominated. Thus, the women's gender identity developed in the field of tensions betweem Communist ideology, practical experience, habitual tradition and alternative Western influences. The

conflict between the identities of a "woman" and "worker" was inevitable. The article is deep and informative, but, at the same time, the author seems to overestimate the influence of Russian cultural tradition with the Soviet cultural landscape in general and its unified character.

Some final articles of the collection also study the post-Socialist period. However, these contributions do not enrich the general picture of the voluminous book very much and perhaps might have been included in another major publication. In the present collection, we have to deal with separate insights, which do not accumulate in an integrated picture. Here, for example, Stefanie Solotych describes the world of work in the Soviet Union, and post-Socialist Russia, from the legal viewpoint, pointing out the continuity of many principles. Alexander Tschepurenko and Tatiana Obydennova give a statistical overview of work relations in contemporary Russian small enterprises, based on a huge database but remains rather shallow without deeper interpretation. T. Chavdarova's comparative analysis of individualism and collectivism, using the example of small entrepreneurs, represents a sociological study of values demonstrating that, in post-Socialism, nepotistic relations re-emerge and cultural codes of old economic relations are reproduced. Until today, people most strongly identify themselves with their families and other informal primary groups, although a certain shift towards more individualist norms and values has occurred.

The article by Christian Giordano and Dobrinka Kostova discusses the transformation of local nomenclature into capitalist entrepreneurs. The study stresses the need to look at transition societies in their cultural-historical context. In this light, they argue that contemporary attempts to develop capitalist entrepreneurship in the rural areas of Central and East-Europe, seeming weird, chaotic or illegal to westerners, are actually rational if we look at the historical context where they come from. Using the example of Bulgaria, the authors state that in the rural regions, capitalism is an unfinished and marginal phenomenon, limited to some urban centres and some branches of the economy. Until 1989, the majority of the population remained ignorant of the specific social knowledge characterising capitalist enterprise strategies (Giordano & Kostova 2004: 380). Since, according to the authors, we still have to deal with the primitive accumulation stage of capitalism, the strategies applied have to be considered normal. In the rural areas of Bulgaria, one is still discovering one's way to capitalism and modernity. The terms of market economy and capitalism are still very vague for the people. The authors, relying on their fieldwork, claim that they were "discovered" only after 1989, although the

notion of private property has already become very important and rooted strongly. The study seems convincing, as far as it concerns Bulgaria, but whether the same scheme can easily be generalised to the whole rural culture of Central and Eastern Europe, as the authors seem to presume in the introductory part of the article (Giordano & Kostova 2004: 379), remains doubtful.

Arbeit im Sozialismus – Arbeit im Postsozialismus offers a diverse picture of work and life under Socialism.The fact that the contributions of Estonian ethnologists are among the strongest in the collection already allows the expectation of a general survey of Soviet Estonian culture in a comparative context in the near future.

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